

THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

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## ABSTRACT

THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSCIOUSNESS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

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This thesis is devoted to critically examining the Argument from Consciousness. The Argument from Consciousness takes consciousness as its datum to arrive at the conclusion that there is a god. Accordingly, one of the premises of the argument draws either on the very existence of consciousness or the correlations between the mental and physical states. There are some different versions of the argument that have been proposed by different philosophers. These different versions of the argument are classified into two in the thesis. Accordingly, while the versions that deny a naturalist explanation of consciousness are classified into the first type, the versions that allow a naturalist explanation of consciousness are classified into the second type. Although the versions of the argument in the second type are stronger than the ones in the first type, both types of the argument have serious liabilities. Hence, in the thesis it is argued that the Argument from Consciousness is not a satisfactory justification for the belief that there exists a god.

**Keywords:** god, consciousness, naturalism, theism, atheism

# ÖZ

## BİLİNÇ ARGÜMANI: ELEŞTİREL BİR İNCELEME

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Bu tez Bilinç Argümanı'nı eleştirel olarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bilinç Argümanı, bir tanrının var olduğu sonucuna ulaşmak için bilinci veri olarak kullanmaktadır. Buna göre, argümanın öncüllerinden biri ya bilincin bizatihi varlığına ya da zihinsel ve fiziksel durumlar arasındaki bağlantılara dayanır. Argümanın çeşitli filozoflar tarafından öne sürülen farklı türleri vardır. Argümanın bu farklı türleri tezde iki kısma ayrılmaktadır. Buna göre, bilincin doğalcı açıklamasını reddeden türler birinci tipte sınıflandırılırken, doğalcı bilinç açıklamasını kabul eden türler ise ikinci tipte sınıflandırılır. Argümanın ikinci tipteki türleri birinci tiptekilerden daha güçlü olsa da argümanın her iki tipinin de ciddi eksiklikleri vardır. Tezde bu eksiklikler göz önünde bulundurulduğunda Bilinç Argümanı'nın tanrının var olduğu inancı için yeteri kadar ikna edici bir gerekçe sunmadığı ileri sürülmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** tanrı, bilinç, doğalcılık, teizm, ateizm

*To My Family*



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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

Different kinds of arguments for the existence of god<sup>1</sup> have been proposed for a long time.<sup>2</sup> Following Kant (2000), these arguments have been categorized into three: cosmological, teleological,<sup>3</sup> and ontological arguments for the existence of god. These arguments have been divided into two in the literature:<sup>4</sup> those that are *a priori* and those that are *a posteriori*. Accordingly, while the cosmological and the teleological argument is taken as *a posteriori*, the ontological argument has been taken as *a priori*. While the arguments that have been classified as *a posteriori* have at least one premise that appeals to the fact/s concerning the reality that might be obtained through experience, the *a priori* arguments do not have any premise that appeals to the fact/s concerning the reality that might be obtained through experience.

Each kind of the arguments have different versions proposed by different philosophers. For instance, the cosmological argument takes as its starting point the existence of the universe. From this starting point different versions of the cosmological argument focus on different features of the universe such as its being contingent or its being finite. The Kalam Cosmological Argument,

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that by the concept of god it is meant the theistic one, that is, the concept of god that includes such attributes as omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and transcendence.

<sup>2</sup> Taliaferro (2019) writes that the roots of philosophy of religion might be traced back in the earliest forms of philosophy.

<sup>3</sup> Kant (2000) calls this argument “physico-theological argument.”

<sup>4</sup> See Oppy (2006).

proposed by William Lane Craig (1979), might be given as an example of a version of the cosmological argument:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause of its existence. (p. 63)

This version of the cosmological argument focuses on the temporal features of the universe, and attempts to derive the conclusion that there is a god. Also, since the argument appeals to a feature of the reality that might be obtained through experience, the argument is classified as *a posteriori*.

There is one argument that has been proposed for the existence of god that is called the Argument from Consciousness. This argument is one that has been discussed very little. Hawthorne and Isaacs (2017) point out to this fact as such: “The argument from consciousness seems very striking (and strangely under-discussed).” Also, this argument is hard to classify into the standard categories enumerated above. While some versions of it resemble pretty much to some versions of the teleological argument, some other versions of it are quite different. For instance, in Oppy (2006) the argument is to be seen in the chapter called “Other Arguments.” Although the argument from consciousness cannot be taken as a kind of the teleological or cosmological argument, the argument from consciousness is *a posteriori*. The reason that the argument is *a posteriori* is that the argument from consciousness includes a premise that appeals to experience, namely, the experience of the existence of conscious mental states.

In this thesis, I will critically examine the argument from consciousness to answer the question whether it is a satisfactory justification for the belief that there exists a god. To achieve my purpose, I start with giving an exposition of the different forms presented by different philosophers of the argument from consciousness in the second chapter based on the distinction I draw. The distinction I draw among different versions of the argument from consciousness is based on whether they include a premise that states that there is or is not a natural explanation of consciousness. In the third chapter, I critically examine the argument by setting

out, first, the criticisms in the literature, and then I move on with pointing out the liabilities of the argument and possible solutions to these liabilities, if there are any at all. My purpose in this chapter is to determine whether the argument from consciousness is a satisfactory justification for the belief that there exists a god. Lastly, I conclude the thesis with some concluding remarks in the fourth chapter.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED

The argument from consciousness (AC) takes consciousness as its datum to arrive at the conclusion that there is a god. One of the premises of the argument from consciousness draws either on the very existence of consciousness or the correlations between the physical events and mental events. That being so, the proponents of the argument put forward that there is some feature of the consciousness that justify the belief in god. Accordingly, when we are conscious, we are having some mental state that has some kind of qualitative aspect. In other words, there is a raw feeling the subject is aware of *what it is like*<sup>5</sup> to have it. Moreover, one has different mode of access to this qualitative aspect. To be more concrete, when I have a pain in my leg, I am aware of what it is like to be in that pain compared to someone else watching me when I undergo the painful experience. The person watching me sees me only behaving in some ways, such as frowning or cursing. Also, I have a different mode of access to the pain. I can be aware of the pain immediately. That is to say, I do not need to have recourse to any type of reasoning. However, the person watching me has to infer that I am in pain from the behavior I exhibit.

The proponents of the argument from consciousness are of the opinion that these kinds of mental states point to god. They argue by presenting their argument by either including a premise stating that there is no natural explanation for such mental states and therefore there is a personal explanation (in this case, a theistic explanation) that gives a better account of these phenomena, or a premise stating that there is some kind of natural explanation of consciousness. Those allowing a

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<sup>5</sup> For the origin of the expression, see Nagel (1974).

natural explanation of consciousness are of the opinion that even if there is a natural explanation for these phenomena, there still is a way for arguing for the existence of god by appealing to the types of arguments that are familiar in design arguments or Bayesian type of reasoning.

There are philosophers agreeing with the line of reasoning just sketched. Accordingly, the argument from consciousness has a long history going back to John Locke (1959). Also, there are some different forms of AC proposed by contemporary philosophers like Swinburne (2004), Adams (1987), Moreland (2008), Kimble and O'Connor (2011), and Page (2020). These different forms of the argument might be divided very broadly into two types. The first type relies on the premise that asserts that there is no natural explanation<sup>6</sup> for consciousness. On the other hand, the second type includes a premise that admits that there is a natural explanation for consciousness, and takes a different route to arrive at the same conclusion. Accordingly, while Locke (1959), Swinburne (2004), Adams (1987), and Moreland (2008) are the instances of the first type, Kimble and O'Connor (2011), and Page (2020) are the instances of the second type. In this chapter, I will provide an exposition of the different forms of AC based on the distinction I have drawn.

## **2.1. The First Type of AC**

The forms of AC I categorize as the first type rely on the premise that states that there is no natural explanation for consciousness. This premise is variously justified depending on the particular philosopher. The reliance on the premise that

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<sup>6</sup> Mackie (1987) makes a distinction between Locke's and Swinburne's arguments by asserting that Locke is of the opinion that consciousness *cannot appear through natural processes*, while Swinburne is of the opinion that there *cannot be any naturalist explanation at all* of the appearance of consciousness. This distinction does not strike me as a robust one. It seems to me that to assert that consciousness cannot appear through natural processes already assumes that there cannot be a natural explanation for it. Hence, Locke would already admit what Swinburne asserts. However, having no naturalist explanation is not a guarantee for not having a natural origin.



states that there is no natural explanation for consciousness, and justifying the premise with the addition of different bells and whistles is the reason why Mackie (1987, p. 187) calls Swinburne (2004) a “remote descendant” of Locke (1959). The case is not different for the other instances of the first type of the argument from consciousness either. Hence, each of the instances of the first type of AC might also be called a “remote descendant” of Locke.

I will provide the exposition of the different forms of AC of the first type in a chronological order. That being the case, I will start with Locke (1959) continuing with Swinburne (2004), Adams (1987) and lastly Moreland (2008). After so doing, I will point out some of the salient common features of the arguments whereby it will be possible to draw a frame applicable to all by formalizing the reasoning inherent in the arguments.

### **2.1.1. “Of Our Knowledge of the Existence of a God”<sup>7</sup>**

Although Locke (1959) is of the opinion that we do not have innate idea of God through which one would be assured of God’s existence, he asserts that one can have evidence which is of the sort of “mathematical certainty” (1959, p. 306). He adds that to get to that epistemic status needs thought and attention, and one has to rely on some intuitive knowledge. First of all, Locke wants to establish that there must exist something from eternity. His starting point is ourselves, that is “...that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence” (Locke, 1959, p. 307). One knows certainly that one exists, according to Locke. Moreover, he puts forward that by an intuitive certainty we know that “...nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles” (Locke, 1959, p. 307). From this he concludes that there must exist something from eternity, since “...we know

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<sup>7</sup> I will take the titles as they appear as the titles in the works of the philosophers whose arguments I am exposing.

there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being”  
(Locke, 1959, p. 308).

The next step of Locke is to investigate what kind of a being that has existed since eternity. Locke points out that man finds in himself perception and knowledge, in addition to finding himself knowing that there are things that are purely material. Accordingly, he distinguishes between cogitative and incogitative beings, the former having the properties like sensibility, thought, and perceiving while the latter are without sense, thought or perception.

Furthermore, according to Locke, every feature of the actual effect has the origin in its cause, at least potentially. Concomitantly, it is impossible that bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being. Regardless of how the particles of matter are put together, no cogitative being would ever come into existence; as their role is to “...knock, impel, and resist one another...; and that is all they can do” (Locke, 1959, p. 314). Similarly, matter cannot in itself produce motion. It must be produced by some other being that is more powerful than matter. Additionally, even if motion and matter were eternal, they would not be able to produce thought. Locke (1959) summarizes his point concisely with these sentences:

So that, if we will suppose nothing first or eternal, matter can never begin to be:  
if we suppose bare matter without motion, eternal, motion can never begin to be:  
if we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal, thought can never begin to be. (p. 314)

In the end, Locke arrives from the consideration of ourselves at the conclusion that “...there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not” (1959, p. 309). All in all, Locke’s argument might be fairly encapsulated the way Oppy (2006) does as follows:

1. There must always have been something in existence.
2. (Therefore) There must be something that has always existed.
3. Every being is either cogitative or incogitative.
4. There are now cogitative beings.

5. From matter and motion alone, thought could never arise; that is, cogitative beings cannot arise from incogitative beings alone.
6. (Therefore) The being that has always existed must be a cogitative being. (p. 383)

### **2.1.2. “The Argument from Colors and Flavors”**

The first thing Swinburne (2004)<sup>8</sup> does is to make a case for the existence of the soul. The soul, according to Swinburne, is an immaterial substance in which mental properties are instantiated. Accordingly, he gives two thought experiments. As an example, the first one is as follows, very briefly. The brain consists of two hemispheres and a brainstem, and it is very well known that given some defect to some part, the brain can manage to function in most of the cases as nearly well as before. Thus, there might be some parts of the brain lacking and the other parts of the brain nonetheless can overtake that part’s functions. Let us assume that my brain is cut into two halves, and one of those parts is put into the skull of a person whose brain has been taken out for some reason and the other part to another skull by adding some other brain parts from my twin brother’s brain to make the newly formed brain function properly. So, the question is which one is me? The person with my left half of my brain or the one with my right half of the brain? According to Swinburne, knowing even every bit of the constituents of the brain would not give us the answer. Neither would the mental states such as memories would be sufficient. Rather what would be the right answer to the question what we essentially are, according to Swinburne, is an immaterial substance in which mental properties are instantiated. Hence, the existence of soul makes sense when it comes to personal identity.

Given the case for the soul, the next question for Swinburne is whether it is more plausible to encounter something like this when theism or materialism is true. Swinburne distinguishes explanation into two: scientific explanation and personal

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<sup>8</sup> Swinburne has presented the argument in some other works as well. See Swinburne (2010, 2018). Also, for some works related to the considerations about AC, see Swinburne (1997, 2019).

explanation. While scientific explanation is explanation in terms of laws of nature, personal explanation is explanation in terms of the powers and intentions of a voluntary agent. If theism were the case, then the explanation would be a personal one. Swinburne puts forward that there is no scientific explanation of immaterial substances, and the correlations of mental states, which are the states of immaterial substances, with the physical states. The reason why there is no scientific explanation is simply because of the discrepancy between these two kinds of substances. That is, while the physical substances are measurable, the non-physical substances are not. Moreover, God has reasons to make immaterial substances come into being. Thus, given theism it is more probable than not that we encounter immaterial substances. Hence, this would furnish an argument<sup>9</sup> for the existence of God.

### **2.1.3. “Flavors, Colors, and God”**

Adams’ (1987)<sup>10</sup> general question is why phenomenal qualities are correlated as they are with physical qualities. In other words, what Adams wants to know is “...why these relationships between brain states and phenomenal qualia obtain rather than others -and indeed why any such regular and constant relationships between things of these two types obtain at all”<sup>11</sup> (1987, p. 245). Adams distinguishes, following Swinburne, between personal and scientific explanation. So, the correlations are either explained personally or scientifically. In the former kind of explanation, the correlations are explained invoking powers and intentional actions of god, in our case. In the latter kind, one would appeal to

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<sup>9</sup> More precisely, a C-inductive argument, in which the premises add to the probability of the conclusion, as opposed to P-inductive argument in which the premises would make the conclusion of the argument more probable than not.

<sup>10</sup> The same text is to be seen in some other work as well. See Adams (1992).

<sup>11</sup> What these questions are concerned with is known in the philosophy of mind literature as the “explanatory gap.” For more, see Levine (1983, 1993).

some laws of nature. These two types of explanation exhaust the live options if one does not take the phenomenon as a brute fact which is no better than saying that there is no explanation at all, which Adams (1987) rightly finds implausible.

Adams states that there is no promissory alternative to theological explanation of the correlations between phenomenal qualia and physical states. His case for the inability of scientific explanation might be put in very broad terms as follows. First, to be satisfactory, an explanation needs to be *general* enough. Otherwise, the phenomenon is only described. So, no answer is given to the question of why it is the case. In our case, for the explanation of mental states in terms of physical states a broad range of physical entities need to be taken into consideration, not only those making up the brain. Secondly, the explanation needs to be *simple* in the sense that comparatively less entities are appealed to or less assumptions are made etc. Lastly, the explanation *should not be circular*, that is, it should not assume what it sets out to explain.

Adams sees two potential ways for the scientific explanation of phenomenal qualia. To start with, we might start by taking mental properties as constituted by other mental properties, as in the case of orange being constituted by yellow and red, thereby having a more general explanation whereby we are able to map mental properties onto the physical ones. However, red or yellow are accepted to be simple; that is, not constituted by further quale. In this case, we still are faced with the question why there is the correlation between the red quale and the physical state which is not simple as the red quale. Hence, we end up with a description, not with the answer why some complex physical state underlies the red quale. Secondly, the correlations might be accounted for through a scientific law which is in the fashion of an algorithm such as:

**L:** If  $F(p) = S(q)$ <sup>12</sup>, then  $p$  causes  $q$ .

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<sup>12</sup> "... $p$  ranges over suitable physical states of affairs, and  $q$  over phenomenal qualia and perhaps over conscious states in general." (Adams, 1987, p. 255).

To have the required generality,  $F(p)$  has to range over a sufficiently broad class of physical entities. For this to be the case  $F(p)$  needs to range over all of the physical entities, otherwise our choice over some part of physical entities would be arbitrary which would not yield a satisfactory explanation. In addition, if  $F(p)$  does not range over all of the physical entities, there is also a risk of only describing what is in need of explanation. The difficulty that arises when  $F(p)$  ranges over all physical entities is that one ends up with *panpsychism*, since every physical entity would then have a corresponding mental state. To avoid this difficulty some non-arbitrary criteria for ascertaining some physical entities that do not have corresponding mental states is needed. On the other hand, the difficulty with  $S(q)$  is that there is no way of assigning numerical value to each quale, and also, we cannot have numerical relationship among different sense modalities such as hearing or tasting etc. In conclusion, Adams asserts that we cannot have a scientific explanation of the correlations between physical states and phenomenal states, which would lead us to the conclusion that the only reasonable account remaining is a theological one appealing to the powers and intentions of a transcendent being.

#### **2.1.4. “Consciousness and the Existence of God”**

Moreland (2008)<sup>13</sup> presents his argument as follows:

1. Mental events are genuine non-physical mental entities that exist.
2. Specific mental event types are regularly correlated with specific physical event types.
3. There is an explanation for these correlations.
4. Personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation.
5. The explanation for these correlations is either a personal or natural scientific explanation.
6. The explanation is not a natural scientific one.
7. Therefore, the explanation is a personal one.

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<sup>13</sup> Although Moreland (2008) is the most comprehensive work on the argument from consciousness, Moreland deals with the argument in some other works as well. See Moreland (2003, 2009, 2013b). Also, for some works related to the considerations about AC, see Moreland (1998, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2013a, 2014).

8. If the explanation is personal, then it is theistic.
9. Therefore, the explanation is theistic. (p. 37)

Moreland starts with assuming the *first* premise to be true. That is, he assumes that the mental states are non-physical. Also, he accepts theism and materialism as the only live options. Like Swinburne and Adams, Moreland draws a distinction between two kinds of explanation, namely, the personal and scientific explanation, in the *fourth* premise. As for the *second* premise, there does not seem to be much discussion. The premise might also be accepted based on the assumption Moreland makes in the first premise, namely, that there are non-physical mental states. Physical and non-physical states would in this picture be correlated, since one cannot be reduced to or identified with another. Given these, Moreland looks for an explanation in the *third* premise.

To justify the *sixth* premise, namely, that the explanation of the mental states is not a scientific one, Moreland puts the following considerations forward. The first consideration is the uniformity of nature. That is, from the very beginning of nature there are only the entities that are bereft of consciousness. However, as we now encounter consciousness, it is like getting something out of nothing, says Moreland. The second one is the contingency of the mind-body correlation. What this says is that there does not seem to exist some necessary connection when it comes to the mind-body correlation. The third is the principle of causal closure. According to this principle whatever physical effect one picks, that physical effect has to have some physical cause. Also, the row of causes keeps in the same level, namely, physical. The last one is about the inadequacy of evolutionary explanations. Sentient beings are black boxes in terms of the evolutionary theory. They could well survive without some conscious processes inside them. All in all, these considerations make the case for the scientific inexplicability of the mental entities.

The *fifth* premise is considered by taking stock of the plausibility of some such naturalist positions to explain consciousness as biological naturalism, emergent necessitation, mysterianism, panpsychism, and emergent monism. Moreland finds

each of these positions wanting.<sup>14</sup> By this, he concludes that the explanation of mental entities is personal. When the explanation is personal, then it is theistic, according to Moreland. Hence, he concludes, the explanation of mental entities is theistic.

To conclude, what all these different forms of the argument have in common is that they rely on the premise that states that there is no natural explanation for the existence of consciousness. To justify this premise the different forms of the argument appeal to different features of the mental states or physical states. For instance, Swinburne appeals to the immeasurability of conscious mental states, or Moreland appeals to the principle of causal closure among others. A frame argument might be given reflecting this case, by excluding the specific details justifying the inexplicability of consciousness naturally, as follows:

1. There are correlations between brain states and conscious states.
2. The explanation of these correlations is to be found either at the basic scientific laws, or at the intentions and actions of a purposeful agent.
3. The basic scientific laws do not provide an adequate explanation.
4. Therefore, the explanation must invoke a purposeful agent.

This kind of reasoning is inherent in all of the forms of the first type of the argument from consciousness. The only difference among them is their justification of the third premise, namely, the premise stating that there is no adequate scientific explanation for the existence of consciousness. In order to justify this premise, different philosophers offer different reasons. Hence, before delving into the discussion of the plausibility of these reasons, it would be more reasonable to address the points common to all of these different forms of the first type of the argument from consciousness. Since if one shows that the type of reasoning above is wanting, then there would not be any point in arguing against

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<sup>14</sup> Delving into details why Moreland finds these positions wanting would be a huge digression. Also, for the exposition and evaluation of the argument, it is not necessary to do so.



the details that try to justify the main points. That's why, I will start by pointing out the difficulties with the main points expressed in the argument above.

However, before jumping into addressing the difficulties of the main points of the arguments above, it needs to be noted that there is another way of arguing that takes consciousness as the relevant datum for the conclusion that there is a god. In the next section, I will give an exposition of the arguments taking a different route.

## **2.2. The Second Type of AC**

The forms of the argument from consciousness I categorize as the second type concede that there is some naturalist explanation of consciousness. Nevertheless, the proponents of the second type look for some other way to reach the conclusion that there is a god. For the time being, there are only two such instances. The first of these is that of Kimble and O'Connor (2011), and the second one is that of Page (2020). Although there are similarities at some points, there are also huge differences. I will carry on with the exposition of these arguments in the next two sections below.

### **2.2.1. "The Argument from Consciousness Revisited"**

Kimble and O'Connor (2011) deal first with the recent positions in philosophy of mind offering physical explanation of the phenomenal character of experience, viz., type physicalism and representationalism. If these accounts are successful, then the arguments advanced by Swinburne (2004) and Adams (1987)<sup>15</sup> will be easily debunked, since the arguments rely very much on the assumption that the

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<sup>15</sup> Although Kimble and O'Connor focus on the arguments of Swinburne and Adams, similar remarks might be made about the other forms of the argument I classified as "the first type of AC."

conscious mental properties are ontologically different than the physical ones. After so doing, they argue that the Swinburne-Adams version of the argument is defective. The reason is that they overlooked some other type of naturalistic explanation of consciousness. Even though allowing the possibility of a naturalistic explanation, Kimble and O'Connor argue that the features of the conscious mental states might be taken as further datum in the fine-tuning version of the design argument.

One of the two positions Kimble and O'Connor aim to refute is what they call *type physicalism*. Type physicalism asserts that even though there is no ontological difference between phenomenal and physical properties, there is an epistemological difference. The difference arises because of the way we *think* of the phenomenal states (Chalmers, 2007). Hence, the advocates of this position avow that we need to focus on the nature of phenomenal concepts through which we access to the phenomenal properties (Balog, 2009). The second one is *representationalism*. Phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like to subjectively undergo that experience (Tye, 2009). For a mental state to be intentional it should be about or directed at something, as in the case of a belief's being about something. Representationalism identifies phenomenal character with the intentional state. The intentional content, varying on different versions, '...consists of entities such as external properties, propositions, or states of affairs' (Kimble & O'Connor, 2011, p. 112).<sup>16</sup>

Kimble and O'Connor make their case for the distinctness of the phenomenal properties from the physical ones appealing to introspection. Their *argument from direct awareness* might be encapsulated as follows:

1. Direct phenomenal awareness reveals the phenomenal properties to be simple.

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<sup>16</sup> Kimble and O'Connor (2011) argue against a version of representationalism that is called *strong representationalism*. In strong representationalism the sensory qualities are identified with the intentional contents. For more on the varieties of representationalism, see Lycan (2019).

2. Physical properties purported to be identical with phenomenal properties are not simple.
3. Therefore, the phenomenal properties are not identical with the physical properties.

The argument from direct awareness is put forward against a line of reasoning as such: The reason we cannot ascertain the identity of phenomenal properties with physical properties is simply because we access to the phenomenal properties through phenomenal concepts instead of physical concepts. But in reality phenomenal properties are physical. It is only because we access phenomenal properties through phenomenal concepts that we take them to be other than physical. Moreover, the phenomenal properties are given to us as they are. That is, there is no descriptive content fixing the reference of the phenomenal concepts. In other words, phenomenal concepts are a kind of pointers, they demonstrate.

So, the question is this: Given that phenomenal concepts refer to the phenomenal properties without any descriptive content, and that phenomenal properties are in reality physical properties, why are we not aware of the phenomenal properties as physical properties? McLaughlin (2004) and Tye (2003) claim that we do not access to their nature. However, Kimble and O'Connor argue that, based on the phenomenal character of experience, we can form judgements applying phenomenal concepts such as this: "this mental state is non-structural." Hence, there is (at least) minimal descriptive content grounded in phenomenology. That is, phenomenal concepts do not only point, they also give some information about the phenomenal properties. Also, appeal to phenomenal concepts ignores the rich phenomenology. For instance, we discriminate between two phenomenal contents based on the phenomenal character of our experience. However, this kind of discrimination is only a semantic one when appealed to phenomenal concepts only. To crystallize their point, Kimble and O'Connor (2011) give such a case:

I look at two large colored squares painted on a wall, a blue square above a red square. ... I first introspectively attend to the blueness of the blue square, and then to the redness of the red square, and in doing so, I exercise phenomenal concepts that directly demonstrate the phenomenal qualities I grasp. (Call the

properties B and R, and the phenomenal concepts that designate them B\* and R\*, respectively.) My introspective awareness of the two squares clearly seems to afford me a qualitatively different grasp of their respective colors, as my two visual experiences differ in a categorical way with respect to their phenomenal character; in one case I am phenomenally aware of B, in the other case of R. Here is the problem: when I introspectively attend to the color qualities of the squares, if there is no minimally descriptive or substantive content that I grasp via my exercise of B\* and R\*—no determinate conception or grasp that reflects the way the phenomenal color properties actually are, but only demonstration— then how am I to account for the qualitative differences in the way the squares look to me, that is, the differences between B and R? (p. 130)

All in all, one needs to either accept minimal description based on phenomenal experience or ignore the rich phenomenology when one appeals to phenomenal concepts. Kimble & O'Connor assert that the second disjunct does not do justice to what we are introspectively aware of.

There are now dual properties to which Kimble & O'Connor search for an explanation. That is, there are now phenomenal and physical properties. Even if phenomenal properties cannot be explained by the reduction to physical properties, there is another type of explanation. Kimble & O'Connor take mental states to emerge from the physical systems organized in the right kind of complexity. According to them, this is possible thanks to the dispositions of the fundamental physical entities when they organize into a whole. Kimble and O'Connor see the prospect of emergence in these dispositions. These dispositions are additions to the well-known locally determinative dispositions of the fundamental particles such as the disposition of negatively charged particles to repel one another. All in all, their expectation for a naturalist explanation lies in the laws charting the patterns of the emergence.

Now, Kimble and O'Connor have a naturalistic explanation<sup>17</sup> of the facts concerning phenomenal properties (such as their correlations with the physical properties). Moreover, Kimble & O'Connor argue that there is a huge range of kinds of physical entities with different dispositions. In this range, the

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<sup>17</sup> i.e., the mental states have emerged from the more basic constituents of the universe by their constituting some threshold complexity.

fundamental entities with just the dispositions making facts concerning phenomenal properties possible constitute a very tiny spot. However, in the actual world there are fundamental entities making facts concerning phenomenal properties possible. Given the huge range of kinds of physical entities, that those fundamental entities happen to be in our universe is of very low probability. Taken into consideration this very low probability, it is more reasonable to look for an intentional action of a personal being. This is the point they take as further datum in the fine-tuning version of the design argument, according to which the contingent features of the universe (such as ratios of basic particles or forces) are so finely tuned to allow the appearance of biological life.

### **2.2.2. “Arguing to Theism from Consciousness”**

Page (2020) proposes the argument in a Bayesian<sup>18</sup> vein. He also takes theism and naturalism as two mutually exclusive live options. Starting from an agnostic’s viewpoint that gives 50 per cent of credence to each of these views, Page discusses then the points that would decrease the probability of theism given consciousness and the points that would increase the probability of naturalism given consciousness. Arguing that theism is more probable given consciousness,

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
<sup>18</sup> Bayes’s theorem is cashed out in the mathematical language as such:

$$Pr(H|E) = Pr(H) \times Pr(E|H) / Pr(E)$$

H stands for hypothesis and E for evidence. In the case of Page’s argument, H can be taken as theism, and E for consciousness.

Page arrives at the conclusion that consciousness is good evidence for theism.<sup>19</sup>

Visually, his starting point seems as such<sup>20</sup> (Page, 2020, p. 338):



Page makes use of what is called Bayesian bar method while presenting his argument. The reason for this is to make it easier for the reader to follow visually what happens in the mathematical apparatus of probability theory. The sections of the bar are divided in accordance with the prior probabilities Page assigns.<sup>21</sup>

Although to explicate what happens in the formal apparatus of probability theory Page assigns some specific numbers to particular sections of the bar in his paper, he is of the opinion that one can appeal to rough values and the Bayesian bar is useful to show this by citing Swinburne:

To accept that Bayes's theorem governs all claims about the support given by evidence to hypotheses does not involve holding that the various probabilities can be given exact numerical values (and, as I noted earlier, inductive probabilities do not normally have exact numerical values.). One can think of them as having rough values, values within certain limits; and the theorem, as putting limits on the values of some probabilities, given the limits on others (Swinburne, 2001, p. 104, as cited in Page (n.d.)).

Next, what Page does is to take posterior probabilities into account. Given that there is consciousness, the portions of the bar with “no consciousness” are


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<sup>19</sup> Page understands evidence as probability raising (2020). Accordingly, in case what he says about consciousness raises the probability of theism, then this would count as substantial evidence for theism.


<sup>20</sup> For more on this way of explicating Bayesianism, see Page (n.d.).

<sup>21</sup> Prior probability is the probability of a theory before considering the evidence. It is also often called as the prior.

removed. After so doing, the bar with posterior probabilities<sup>22</sup> (given that consciousness exists) looks as follows (Page, 2020, p. 338):



Although the portion including theism has increased, the increase is not such as to be that much significant. As to why the increase is not that much is that, first, god could have reasons not to create anything at all or more specifically consciousness at all. Second, there could be possible atheistic worlds that promote the existence of consciousness. That’s why, Page asserts that the argument might be revamped when the laws of nature are taken into consideration. To present his revamped version of the argument Page starts with these priors (2020 , p. 341):<sup>23</sup>



With the addition of the laws of nature the priors have changed significantly. Since there is consciousness, Page goes on with removing the portions of the bar denying consciousness.

The next step of Page is to justify the probability assignments. So, he has two aims. First, to make his case that consciousness is more probable given theism. Second, consciousness is less probable given naturalism. What decreased the probability of consciousness given theism in his former, not revamped, argument was that god might not have created consciousness. Thus, he enlists some reasons

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<sup>22</sup> Posterior probability is the probability possessed after the evidence.

<sup>23</sup> LoN stands for laws of nature.

why it is probable that god creates consciousness such as his being perfectly loving or his interest in being in relationship with creatures. Next, he sustains his second aim, namely that consciousness is less probable given naturalism. What increased the probability of consciousness given naturalism was that the possibility of worlds promoting the existence of consciousness. Accordingly, Page makes use of the laws of nature to realize his aim. It seems to be that by so doing he takes the possible worlds that have the laws of nature as our own.

As to the first reason decreasing the probability of consciousness given theism, namely, that god might not have created anything at all, Page asserts that god has created somethings, i.e., laws of nature. On the other hand, as to his second reason increasing the probability of consciousness given atheism, namely, that there could be possible worlds promoting the existence of consciousness, Page is of the opinion that the laws of nature on their own are not apt to bring about conscious mental states. He asserts that however we put together the physical entities we would not get consciousness out of these compositions. To support his point he cites McGinn:

Consider the universe before conscious beings came along: the odds did not look good that such beings could come to exist. The world was all just physical objects and physical forces, devoid of life and mind. The universe was as mindless then as the moon is now. The raw materials for making conscious minds—matter in motion—looked singularly unpromising as the building-blocks of consciousness. . . . It appears as if the impossible has occurred. Unconscious physical particles have conspired to generate conscious minds. (McGinn, 1999; pp. 14-15, as cited in Page, 2020)

To strengthen his point, Page considers three different approaches to consciousness: materialism, dualism, and panpsychism. By taking into consideration these different approaches to consciousness he aims to show that in each of these approaches the existence of consciousness is more probable given theism, and less probable given atheism. Page takes some different materialist positions into account such as identity theory or functionalism. Whether it is identity approach or functionalist approach, the pattern of reasoning of Page is pretty much similar. To give a sketch of it, such an instance might be given: given that it is of very low probability that physical entities come into being on their



own and constitute a composition conducive to the existence of consciousness, it is more reasonable to take the other live option, i.e., theism, to be more probable since there is a being intending for the existence of consciousness. He takes the similar route for the other materialist positions like functionalism or the position taking consciousness as evolved as some kind of spandrel.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, Page uses the same pattern of reasoning in the case of other approaches to consciousness. He takes, whether substance or property, dualism more probable given theism, and thus it is more reasonable to adopt theism. Similarly, panpsychist approach to consciousness is more probable on theism, according to Page, and thus it is more reasonable to adopt theism. What is important in the route he takes is that it is not of a big deal whether consciousness is materialistic, and hence naturalistic, or not. The point, accordingly, is whether it is more probable given theism or naturalism that consciousness *would* come into being, not that whether it *could* come into being. Thus, as it concedes the possibility of the nature of consciousness as natural, the argument of Page is an instance of the second type of AC.

As has been arrived at the end with the exposition of the arguments, I will continue with critically examining them in the next chapter.

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<sup>24</sup> Spandrel is taken as evolutionary by-product of the feature or features selected. The term “spandrel” is originally used in architecture, for a brief remark on this, see Gould & Lewontin (1979). Also, as examples of works proposing this idea, see Gould (1997) and Gould & Lewontin (1979).

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ARGUMENTS PRESENTED**

In this chapter, I will examine the arguments relying on consciousness to arrive at the conclusion that god exists that have been presented in the previous chapter. I will start with the first type of the argument from consciousness, and then move on to the second type. My aim will not be to defend any of the forms of the arguments, rather I will take stock of them and thereby try to ascertain whether the argument from consciousness is a satisfactory justification for the belief that there is a god. However, before turning to my assessment of the argument from consciousness, I will briefly give an exposition of the assessments of the argument from consciousness in the literature.

#### **3.1. The Critical Examinations of AC in the Literature**

Although it has been proposed by prominent philosophers in the field like Richard Swinburne, the argument from consciousness is an argument that has been the least discussed in the literature. Hawthorne and Isaacs (2017) point out to this fact as such: “The argument from consciousness seems very striking (and strangely under-discussed).” Hence, there are few works to refer to when it comes to the critical examination of the argument. What’s more, the works dealing critically with the argument address only some forms of the argument from consciousness. Some other forms of the argument have not even been taken into consideration. Accordingly, the ones that have been most discussed are Locke’s, Swinburne’s and Moreland’s arguments. Additionally, Locke’s argument has been only mentioned as an antecedent to the ones that have been presented recently, and has

not been dealt with rigorously in some works.<sup>25</sup> In this section, I will briefly set out some of the criticisms advanced to some forms of the argument from consciousness. By doing so, I aim to show that there are considerations supporting my point, namely that AC is not fully satisfactory, and that the liabilities of it I am going to point out differ from and are additions to the ones in the literature. Accordingly, the works that critically examine the argument from consciousness are Mackie (1987); Martin (1990); Oppy (2006, 2011, 2013a).<sup>26</sup> While Mackie (1987) and Oppy (2006) start with exposing the argument presented by Locke (1959), and then move on with taking stock of Swinburne's argument; Oppy (2011, 2013a) examine Moreland's argument, and Martin (1990) examines Swinburne's argument only.

The first point Mackie (1987) and Oppy (2006) see as problematic is that Locke (1959) relies on a fallacious reasoning. What Locke does is to infer from the claim that there has always been some cogitative being the conclusion that there has always been some *particular* being that is cogitative existing eternally. The second point they indicate is the possibility that he may have not expressed himself that much clearly and his argument might be understood in terms of a form of cosmological argument.<sup>27</sup> That is, he might have had the intention, they say, to argue that going back in the causal chain one would end up with some particular being that is cogitative and cause of all the beings that are both cogitative and incogitative. However, given the discussion they have set out in some other parts of their works, they add, this type of arguing is not satisfactory

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<sup>25</sup> For these works see Mackie (1987) and Oppy (2006). For a somewhat rigorous examination of Locke's argument see Ayers (1981).

<sup>26</sup> There is one more critical examination of AC on infidels.org. For this critical examination, see Conifer (2001). However, Conifer (2001) seems to misrepresent the argument. That is, he presents the argument in such a way that the conclusion does not follow from the premises and sees this as a defect of AC. Hence, I will not deal with it.

<sup>27</sup> For such an interpretation, they rely on Ayers (1981). More precisely, Mackie (1987) relies on Ayers (1981) and Oppy (2006) relies on Mackie (1987) taking this interpretation as implied by Mackie (1987).

either. Moreover, they assert that the view of Locke about the material entities (or incogitative entities, in his terms) is pretty much outdated, given what we know today. Mackie (1987), for instance, is of the opinion that the claims of Locke about the material entities are very much crude, given the developments in contemporary physics and computer technology. Lastly, Mackie addresses the concession of Locke that it is possible that the material entities are capable of being cogitative only on the condition of the superadditive act of god. For Mackie, it is not clear why if material entities are capable of being cogitative, one needs to posit some feature of material entities preventing them from being cogitative on their own.

The argument presented by Swinburne (2004) is levelled with criticisms as to his standards for a scientific explanation of consciousness. Swinburne sees three difficulties for a scientific explanation of the correlations of the mental and physical. First, he asserts that one has different mode of access to the mental and physical, and thus one has difficulty in correlating them. Secondly, the correlations need to be given in a causal account. Thirdly, the causal account needs to be based on simple natural laws. Mackie (1987) replies to the first difficulty by pointing out that a materialist needs only to concede that it is possible to correlate the mental and physical *in principle*. To the second point Swinburne makes Mackie replies by drawing on some works in philosophy of mind literature that assert that it is not surprising that there are no psychophysical laws, because the mental and physical terms or descriptions subject to different constraints.<sup>28</sup> For instance, some thoughts might be reasonable, but one cannot assign such a predicate to the physical. Moreover, based on different constraints the mental and the physical are subject to, one might also argue that there is only a linguistic distinction that does not correspond to what is in the physical reality. Lastly, Swinburne takes personal explanation of the correlations of the mental and physical as simple. However, Mackie argues that what is taken as personal explanation based on our experience is at the bottom not simple at all. To

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<sup>28</sup> The works Mackie (1987) refers to are Davidson (2002) and McGinn & Hopkins (1978).

crystallize his point, consider this: when we raise our hand, we have the experience of this action of being simply based on our intention. However, there are a lot of physical processes<sup>29</sup> going on at the more fundamental level. Thus, personal explanation is not simpler than the scientific one, says Mackie. In addition to the criticisms advanced by Mackie (1987), Oppy (2006) also advances some criticisms some of them quite in line with those of Mackie and some of them are different. First, Oppy does not see the distinction between personal and scientific explanation as a robust one either. Secondly, Oppy deals with the tools Swinburne makes use of both to argue for AC and for his other arguments. The tools of Swinburne are among others as such: simplicity, prior probability, and explanatory power. For instance, as to simplicity, Oppy does not see why the simplest theory needs to be the true one. Also, Oppy argues that Swinburne's presentation of AC is not full-fledged, since he does not consider the other physicalist accounts such as various supervenience theses or functionalism.

Oppy (2011, 2013a) starts his criticisms by pointing out what he understands from naturalism is quite different than what Moreland (2008) understands from naturalism. Accordingly, while Moreland takes naturalism to reject, for instance, first philosophy, Oppy takes naturalism to include first philosophy when naturalists take into consideration the theoretical virtues such as simplicity to arrive at the conclusion that naturalism is the best worldview. Or, while Moreland asserts that naturalists have to accept scientific theories like the Big Bang theory or the Evolutionary theory as part of the etiology of things, Oppy asserts that there are naturalist that do not accept the Big Bang theory. Hence, Moreland's move that given his conception of naturalism, theism is a better alternative to explain consciousness is wrongheaded at the very beginning. Another criticism of Oppy is about Moreland's take on what consciousness is. Moreland claims consciousness to be non-physical. Moreover, he asserts in some parts of his work/s that "property/event and substance dualism are so obviously true that it is hard to see

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<sup>29</sup> "In the context of the mind-body problem, the physical usually goes beyond the properties and phenomena studied in physics; the biological, the chemical, the geological, and so on, also count as physical." (Kim, 2011, p. 7).

why there is so much contemporary hostility to dualism in its various incarnations” (2008, p. 175). On the other hand, Oppy argues that when it comes to the conception of conscious qualities, he is “...sympathetic to the kind of view about consciousness that is developed by Dennett” (2013a, p.139). Oppy does not deny that we do have itches, tickles and so on. What he says is that conscious qualities arise from certain kinds of natural processes. Thus, the first premise of Moreland’s argument is unsatisfactory for Oppy. Lastly, Oppy dwells on Moreland’s method. Oppy’s conception of naturalism is quite simple: the natural causation exhausts natural reality. Some other versions of naturalism are derived from this conception. On the other hand, theism accepts at least one supernatural cause. Oppy agrees with Moreland in broad outlines about the theoretical virtues such as basicity,<sup>30</sup> naturalness,<sup>31</sup> fit with data, or simplicity etc. He adds that given these theoretical virtues it is more reasonable to favor naturalism to theism, as opposed to Moreland’s view that it is more reasonable to favor theism to naturalism.

### 3.2. The Critical Examination of the First Type of AC

The characteristic distinguishing the first type of AC is that the instances of it include a premise putting forward that there is no natural explanation of consciousness whereby they conclude with a statement putting forward that the explanation is a personal one, in this case a theological one. Hence, it is a good starting point to discuss whether this kind of strategy is a plausible one.

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<sup>30</sup> Moreland uses as one of the theoretical virtues what he calls *basicity* and defines it as such: “...to take some phenomenon as *ontologically basic* such that only a description and not an explanation for it is required, or whether that phenomenon should be understood as something to be explained in terms of *more basic* phenomena.” (Moreland, 2008, pp. 28-29).

<sup>31</sup> Also, Moreland uses as one of the theoretical virtues what he calls *naturalness* and defines it as such “Some entity (particular thing, process, property, or relation) *e* is natural for a theory *T* just in case either *e* is a central, core entity of *T* or *e* bears a relevant similarity to central, core entities in *e*’s category within *T*.” (Moreland, 2008, p. 29).

### 3.2.1. No Natural Explanation, Therefore God

The first type of the argument from consciousness resembles pretty much to a type of reasoning for the existence of god especially notorious in that it even has a name, namely “the god of the gaps” reasoning. As its name suggests, this type of reasoning takes as one of its premises the assertion that there is some phenomenon for which there is no natural explanation, or that there is no natural explanation in the offing in milder forms. Even theists are hesitant when it comes to the move to the conclusion for the existence of god based on the assertion of inexplicability of some phenomenon naturally (Adams, 1987).

The philosophers advancing the first type of AC are of the opinion that they are not arguing for the existence of god by covering some gap. Swinburne, for instance, makes his case for the inexplicability of consciousness making use of the distinction between the physical and phenomenal properties. While the former properties are amenable to mathematical description, the latter properties are not. Since phenomenal properties are not amenable to mathematical description, it is not possible to chart the connections between the physical and phenomenal properties mathematically. This is also claimed to be the reason why there cannot be scientific laws charting these connections. Hence, there is no scientific explanation for the phenomenal properties, according to Swinburne. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Swinburne here assumes that there cannot be laws ranging over qualitative properties (description of which are not mathematical) and also simple Deductive-Nomological Model of explanation;<sup>32</sup> however, this is too simplistic and unrealistic account of science and would not take Swinburne very far, unless he deals with more sophisticated models in the philosophy of science. On the other hand, what Adams and Moreland do when it comes to advance the

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<sup>32</sup> “The word “nomological” means to pertain to laws, and deductive is there to describe the strict logical connection between the premises of the explanatory argument, that is, the statement of the law and relevant conditions, and the conclusion, the description of the phenomenon to be explained. It is a necessary connection in the sense that, if the law is true and if the conditions hold, the event must occur. This is the warrant for expectation of the event.” (Kosso, 1992, p. 55).

inexplicability of consciousness naturally is to add some further details to the distinction Swinburne makes, as has been cashed out in the previous chapter (Chapter 2).<sup>33</sup>

Among the instances of the first type of AC distinguishing itself from the others by allowing the possibility of some material systems to instantiate consciousness is Locke's argument (Ayers, 1981; Locke, 1959). Nevertheless, he does so only on the condition that there needs to be some act of god whereby he *superadds* consciousness to these physical systems. Thus, there still needs to be some intervention for there to exist consciousness, although this concession weakens his position. The reason why Locke's concession weakens his position is that it in some way supports the naturalist claim that some physical systems can possess consciousness.

Now, the proponents of the first type of AC justify themselves that they are not covering some gap by pointing out that they have given reason/s why there is no natural explanation for consciousness. However, it seems to be too hasty to arrive at the conclusion that there is no natural explanation of consciousness. There is, for instance, a "...leading physicalist approach to phenomenal consciousness" (Kim, 2011, p. 333) called *representationalism*. Let us suppose that you are looking at a tree with green leaves. Now, concentrate on your experience of the tree. You will not detect properties of your experience to be other than the properties of the tree. Hence, according to representationalism, the properties taken to constitute the phenomenal experience are in fact the properties of the entities one has experience of. What this means is that there are no properties that are impossible to access from third person point of view. To access the properties of phenomenal consciousness one only needs to look at the properties of the entities that are out in the environment of the subject. Briefly, what generally is taken as qualitative states of consciousness is taken as intentional states, which are supposed to be amenable to natural explanation. Even only this example is

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<sup>33</sup> This is the reason why the forms of the first type of AC do not differ apart from in details.



sufficient to be skeptical about the strategy to the conclusion based on the inexplicability of consciousness through natural means. It is pretty much clear that there is a conflict at the very beginning, which is not consistent, for example, with what Swinburne somewhere else (i.e., 2007) asserts, namely, that the arguments for the existence of god need to start with the premise/s taken to be obvious to all parties. Given that there are whole lot of philosophers disagreeing with the central premise of the first type of AC, it is pretty much clear that the premise is not obvious to everyone.

Moreover, besides representationalism there are other approaches that attempt to give a naturalist account of consciousness. Among these, the most prominent ones are higher order theories of consciousness and phenomenal concept strategy. In very broad terms, how the higher order theories of consciousness set out to naturalize consciousness is by positing some other mental state<sup>34</sup> which makes sure that the mental state that is not conscious makes it conscious. On the other hand, some have appealed to phenomenal concepts to make their case that there are no mental states over and above the physical ones. Accordingly, the difference between the mental and the physical does not lie in their ontological status, instead the difference lies in the access to the same substance in different ways. While we make use of physical concepts when it comes to the physical, we make use of phenomenal concepts when it comes to the mental. So, the difference is only epistemic.

All in all, given such approaches to naturalize consciousness as just mentioned, it does not seem to be plausible to simply rely on a premise asserting that there is no natural explanation for consciousness. No matter how one justifies the premise, there will be some answer from the physicalist approaches that overturn that justification. Let us, to make my point more concrete, take Swinburne's distinction between physical properties and mental properties based on

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<sup>34</sup> Depending on the particular theory, the mental state providing other mental states with consciousness is taken as the higher order *perception* or higher order *thought*.

phenomenal experience<sup>35</sup> and his step thereby to the conclusion that there are two substances in which each of the properties are instantiated, namely, his conclusion to substance dualism. A proponent of phenomenal concept strategy, for instance, might contest that there is only the experience of the so-called discrepancy simply because of the different concepts one makes use of. There is in reality no property corresponding to what one accesses through phenomenal concepts. The same properties, in this case the physical ones, are conceived in different ways. Hence, all the properties are physical. In case what phenomenal concept strategy avows reflects the real nature of the mental states, then let alone substance dualism not even property dualism takes off the ground. Therefore, the first type of the argument from consciousness has a liability when it comes to the premise stating that there is no natural explanation for consciousness. The liability arises from the fact that there are physicalist approaches to consciousness that are promissory on the one hand, and it does not seem to be obvious to arrive at the conclusion that there is no or will not be some natural explanation of consciousness in the future by pure reflection on the other hand.

### **3.2.2. The First Step: Dualism**

The instances of the first type of AC and one instance of the second type<sup>36</sup> take a similar route in reaching their conclusions, namely, they all set out to give a dualistic account of mentality. Dualism comes in different forms. All these different forms might be said to fall under two broad rubrics: substance dualism and property dualism. According to substance dualism there are two substances. While one of these substances is mental, the other is physical. Accordingly, mental substances are diverse from and can pursue their existence apart from the

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<sup>35</sup> “Evidently—more evidently than anything else—there really are pure mental events, as we know from our own experience. They include patterns of colour in my visual field, pains and thrills, beliefs, thoughts and feelings.” (Swinburne, 2004, p. 195).

<sup>36</sup> The argument presented by Kimble & O’Connor (2011).

physical ones. Moreover, the beings with mentality are identical with the mental, or immaterial, substances. On the other hand, property dualism<sup>37</sup> takes there to be one substance, and that substance is physical. Moreover, mental properties are instantiated in this substance, whence it is a dualistic view. Thus, mental properties are neither the ones that are reducible to nor identical with the physical properties. While in contemporary philosophy of mind substance dualism does not have many proponents, property dualism is a position with many philosophers arguing for it.

The opinions of the philosophers arguing for the argument from consciousness vary when it comes to dualism. While some make their dualism clear by spelling it in detail out such as Swinburne (2004), who accepts substance dualism, or Kimble & O'Connor (2011) who argue for an emergentist view of the mental, others are less clear about their position such as Moreland (2008), who only asserts to take mental phenomena as they are experienced as in commonsense.<sup>38</sup> Nonetheless, what all these philosophers have in common is that they all are of the opinion that there is some necessity for some dualism for the argument from consciousness to work. Nevertheless, this assumption does not seem to me to be a good one.

There is a persuasive reason to be pointed out that the assumption that some kind of dualism needs to be accepted to argue from consciousness to the existence of god is not a well-grounded one. First, it seems for some philosophers it is not incoherent to be an atheist and substance dualist at the same time.<sup>39</sup> Although being a property dualist and atheist at the same time does not seem to many

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<sup>37</sup> Also known as non-reductive physicalism.

<sup>38</sup> However, in some other works it is clear that he is a substance dualist. See Moreland (2014).

<sup>39</sup> It should be noted that that there are philosophers that are atheist and substance dualist at the same time does not show that atheism and substance dualism is not incoherent *per se*. It might be true that these philosophers are only incoherent.

philosophers to be a great difficulty as might be witnessed given the philosophy of mind literature, there is also not a huge difficulty in being a substance dualist and an atheist at the same time.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, there is a real-life example of a philosopher whom John Searle mentions in one of his philosophy of mind courses<sup>41</sup> that is substance dualist and atheist at the same time. Second, there are theist philosophers that are physicalist when it comes to mentality. For such philosophers, Peter van Inwagen might be given as an example.<sup>42</sup> For these philosophers the first step taken by the proponents of AC would not be a persuasive one.

In addition, it might also be the case that not everything referred to as mental is reducible to or identifiable with the physical while constituting what is physical. The mental states commonly called intentional, such as beliefs or desires and so on, are generally accepted to be reducible to the physical while phenomenal mental states are generally accepted to be more persistent. To a philosopher with some other reasons, such as the causal closure of the physical among others, physicalism might be more appealing even though giving a physicalist account of the phenomenal mental states seems more intractable. In this case, it seems reasonable to view phenomenal conscious states to be a constituent of the physicalist framework, although there is not a satisfactory physicalist account for them yet. Given that the proponents of AC rely primarily on phenomenal mental

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<sup>40</sup> Graham Oppy, one of the well-known atheist philosophers of religion, points out how such a case might be possible (2013b, p. 55): "...the naturalist\* can claim that souls are *caused* to come into existence by brains achieving the right level of functioning, souls continue to interact causally with brains that have the right level of functioning, and souls are *caused* to go out of existence by brains ceasing to have that level of functioning." Thus, a naturalist might be a substance dualist by taking souls as caused to come into being by brains and to depend for their existence on brains. As opposed to a version of substance dualism in which souls can exist without brains, the kind of substance dualism Oppy points out is not incompatible with naturalism. It should be noted that Oppy is not a dualist. He only points out that there is still a way for a naturalist to take dualism in accordance with naturalism.

<sup>41</sup> The courses are accessible on YouTube. Searle mentions the philosopher in his third course. The link to access the course is: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QCcSM7wPwBY>

<sup>42</sup> For the case Inwagen makes for his view, see Inwagen (1995).

states to make their case for their particular dualism, it seems that not everyone would be persuaded by the tack taken by them.

In conclusion, the reason the proponents of the argument from consciousness provide their argument is to persuade the other parties. However, since the first type of the argument from consciousness is provided based on the dualist nature of consciousness, the kind of above-mentioned philosophers would not find the argument from consciousness persuasive at the very beginning. Given that there are only a few substance dualists today (Kim, 2011), the argument is inevitably less influential. That being so, the argument from consciousness would address only a small number of people. This is the reason that needs to be pointed out that the assumption that some kind of dualism needs to be accepted to argue from consciousness to the existence of god is not a well-grounded one.

Thus far I have dwelled upon two points weakening the first type of the argument from consciousness. There is another point weakening the first type of AC, however this point is applicable to the second type of AC as well. That is why I will come to this point after I take stock of the second type of AC as well. This point is advanced in Section 3.3.3 below. Without further ado I start with examining the second type of AC.

### **3.3. The Critical Examination of the Second Type of AC**

The adherents of the second type of AC agree with the naturalist that there is a natural explanation of consciousness. Nevertheless, they further argue that there is still a way of arriving at the conclusion that there is a god given that there is the phenomenon of consciousness. Currently, there are two alternatives of the second type of AC. First one is that of Kimble and O'Connor (2011). The second one is that of Ben Page (2020). Although these two alternatives concede that there is a natural explanation of consciousness, the tack they take to argue for their conclusion is somewhat different.

### 3.3.1. Kimble and O'Connor on AC

Kimble and O'Connor (2011) make their case by first giving a dualistic account of the mentality. The way they do so is by dealing with two of the forerunning theories of consciousness<sup>43</sup> in the philosophy of mind literature, as has been exposed in Section 2.1.1. After finding these two approaches to mentality unsatisfactory, the philosophers propose as a better alternative a dualistic account which they label as *primitivism*. In very broad terms, primitivism asserts that the mental states, when introspected, are simple in the sense that their "...instantiation does not even partly consist in the instantiation of a plurality of more basic properties by either the entity itself or its parts" (Kimble & O'Connor, 2011, p. 113). Further, the mental states are there, because they have emerged from the more basic physical entities of the universe. Accordingly, the fundamental entities have properties that are instantiated when they reach a certain threshold of complexity besides their local properties "...such as the disposition of negatively charged particles to repel one another, absent countervailing forces" (Kimble & O'Connor, 2011, p. 136). Even if there are dual properties, according to Kimble and O'Connor, it is pretty much possible to give a naturalistic account of these. Instead of a very simple one equation accounting for the behavior of the entities in the universe, there might be some very few equations that chart the relationships of these entities and the properties emerging from these entities. Thus, those very few equations would then be the most basic ones charting the behavior of the most fundamental entities in the universe. In consequence, even if the mentality is of dualistic in nature, there still is a naturalistic explanation.

Nevertheless, Kimble and O'Connor do not stop here. They are of the opinion that there is still a way of arguing for god from consciousness. They assert that the argument from consciousness might be cast in a design type of argument. By the design argument, they have in mind specifically the more prevalent form of the

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<sup>43</sup> *Representationalism* and what they call *type physicalism* (also known in the literature most of the time as the phenomenal concept strategy).

argument called “fine-tuning argument.” Accordingly, that there are mental properties is further datum that the universe is finely tuned, in that it is of a very low probability given that there is a huge range of entities and only a tiny spot of those entities are conducive to the appearance of the mental properties. Kimble and O’Connor follow the steps of Neil A. Manson (2003) to advance their argument, and instead of delving into details they only sketch the way the argument might be cast in the formal apparatus of Bayesian confirmation theory.<sup>44</sup> Now, the question is this: is it a good way to cast the argument from consciousness in the way just sketched?

First and foremost, it is pretty reasonable that they do not see any trouble in conceding a naturalistic explanation for the dualistic nature of the mentality for the reasons given in Section 3.2.2. Hence, Kimble and O’Connor have dodged one of the difficulties of the first type of AC. By conceding a naturalistic explanation they also dodge the other difficulty, i.e., that the AC is one form of the god of the gaps type of reasoning for the existence of god, canvassed in Section 3.2.1. What is novel in their argument is the stance that might be called emergentism and their casting the argument in the design argument from fine-tuning form. Thus, it is appropriate to look at these two elements, namely that the mental has emerged and the cogency of the fine-tuning arguments.

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<sup>44</sup> “L = a universe’s basic parameters must be finely tuned for intelligent life to exist in it.  
E = Our universe permits intelligent life.  
D = There is a supernatural universe designer.

Where “P(A/B)” is to be read as “the probability of A, given that B is true,” the argument’s proponent contends that:

P(E/L & ~D) is *very* low.  
P(E/L & D) is significant.  
P(D/L) is significantly greater than P(E/L & ~D).” (Kimble & O’Connor, 2011, p. 139)

Although emergence seems to be a plausible position to take, it is most of the time discredited as having some aura of magic (Strawson, 2008). Strawson (2008) has this to say:

If emergence can be brute, then it is fully intelligible to suppose that non-physical soul-stuff can arise out of physical stuff—in which case we can't rule out the possibility of Cartesian egos *even if we are physicalists*.<sup>45</sup> I'm not even sure we can rule out the possibility of a negative number emerging from the addition of certain positive numbers. We will certainly have to view with equanimity all violations of existing laws of (non-experiential) physics, dross turning adventitiously into gold, particles decaying into other particles whose joint charge differs from that of the original particle. (p. 66)

In case emergence<sup>46</sup> is brute, one cannot rule out some unwanted absurd phenomena to encounter in reality. Hence, there needs to be some kind of dependence between X and Y where Y emerges from X. Being aware of this, Kimble and O'Connor assert that the fundamental entities have relational properties that arise when they come together, besides their local properties. Moreover, these relational properties are the reason why there are emergent properties. Thus, the difficulty Strawson proposes is not so great anymore. However, the question now is why we need to posit the fundamental entities to have relational properties.

The answer to this question needs to be replied by scientific enquiry. It is pretty much clear that the assertion is about the physical reality, and the most sophisticated way of knowing about the physical reality is through science. Thus, it does not seem to be reasonable to do some armchair philosophy about the

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<sup>45</sup> Emphasis in original.

<sup>46</sup> By emergence it is meant to be "strong emergence." According to strong emergence the emergent properties have weaker dependence on the fundamental entities and more causal powers. The mind is taken most of the time as an example for strong emergence.



physical reality.<sup>47</sup> So, are there some research indicating that the fundamental entities have relational properties conducive to the appearance of emergent properties? As yet there does not happen to be powerful, let alone compelling, evidence pointing to the relational properties of the fundamental entities. But science is apt to surprise us with new discoveries, as its history testifies. Hence, it is too early to argue from consciousness to the existence of god relying on some emergentist stance assigning some properties to the fundamental entities that are the research area of science.

The second element novel in Kimble and O'Connor's argument from consciousness is the way they propose the argument. They cast the argument in the form of design argument from fine-tuning. So, the question is whether the fine-tuning argument is cogent, on the one hand, and whether proposing the argument in the form of fine-tuning is appealing. As for the first question, the literature abounds with both positive and negative assessments. Moreover, delving into that literature would be a huge digression, and the second question is more relevant for us now.

So, is it a good way to cast the argument from consciousness using the terminology of design argument from fine-tuning? Casting the argument as such has some difficulties. First, every difficulty of the fine-tuning argument will be the difficulty of AC. For instance, the delicate ratios adverted to in fine-tuning arguments are explicable by invoking multiverses. If there are a huge number of, or probably infinitely many, universes, then there does not seem to be anything surprising that one among those whole lot of universes contains life. In the same way, if there are a huge number of, or probably infinitely many, universes, then that there is one universe containing conscious beings would not be surprising at all either.

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<sup>47</sup> That Kimble and O'Connor are in agreement with can be seen from what they say: "Neither [local nor relational properties] are transparently "intelligible" to human inquirers in the way Leibniz and Spinoza imagined." (2011, p. 136).

Secondly, casting the argument in such a way makes AC not a full-fledged argument but only a tiny component to support the design argument from fine-tuning. Proposing that it is of very low probability that among huge range of fundamental entities only those that have the disposition to make conscious mental states emerge are there to be seen, and aiming at the conclusion that god is the best alternative for this case is only a version of fine-tuning with a domain narrowed down to conscious mental states from a lot of physical features appealed to in design argument from fine-tuning. In any case, AC would not have strong footing which makes it difficult for someone to find the argument appealing on its own. Thus, the argument from consciousness would be a component in cumulative case argument<sup>48</sup> at most.

Finally, we have yet no strong support from science that the fundamental entities have relational properties that make the emergence of mental states possible, as canvassed above. All in all, the form of the argument from consciousness Kimble and O'Connor propose has some above-mentioned strong points; however, given what has been pointed out it is both too early to argue from consciousness to god in such a way and the argument does not rest on strong footing given that it only provides some data to the design argument from fine-tuning. Hence, although stronger than the forms of AC of the first type, fine-tuning type of AC does not seem to be appealing either.

### **3.3.2. Ben Page on AC**

The way Page presents the argument, that is, making use of the Bayesian probability theory, is a common and well-received way of arguing to the

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<sup>48</sup> "...a number of arguments that on their own inductively supported a particular conclusion but none of which considered in isolation raised the probability of this conclusion beyond 50 per cent and thus did not on their own count as inductively sound might, when taken together, raise the probability of the conclusion beyond 50 per cent..." (Mawson, 2005, p. 119)

conclusion that there is a god.<sup>49</sup> It also seems to me to be a reasonable way to make the case for or against the existence of god. The reason for this is the tentative nature of this way of arguing, given that the history of thought is full of examples of thinkers whose arguments were easily refuted by the new findings. On that account, the style of Page's presentation of the argument has a positive aspect.

However, one of the difficulties seems to be the way he justifies his prior probabilities. What diminishes the probability of god's creating consciousness is the possibility of god's choosing not to create anything at all. To show that it is more probable that god creates consciousness, Page enumerates some possible reasons such as god's being perfectly loving which would then become grounds for his creating creatures to interact with, or his wanting to share his knowledge such as *what it is like* to have subjective experiences. These reasons for god's creative acts do not strike me as persuasive at all. There does not seem to be some strong connection between being perfectly loving, and because of this bringing some beings into being to have some interaction with. Moreover, Oppy (2011, p. 196) gives a counterexample to being perfectly loving and therefore being apt to bring into being some beings as such: "...we all know people who are not interested in meaningful relationship with others and who have no desire at all to bring other people into being." Also, having the intention to share knowledge does not seem to be strong reason to bring into being some beings. The reason why I do not see these possible reasons as persuasive is probably because Page and I do not have the same conception of god, even though both of us focus on the theistic conception of god. It is pretty much clear that these properties Page attributes to god are accidental ones, which means that god could have continued to be the same being without having these properties at all.<sup>50</sup> In other words,

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<sup>49</sup> For the history and examples of such a way of arguing for the existence of god, see Chandler & Harrison (2012).

<sup>50</sup> For a detailed discussion of the essential and accidental properties of god, see Mawson (2005).

Page's conception of god is pretty much influenced by that of Christianity. However, the accidental properties attributed to god by mainstream Christianity need not necessarily be accepted by other theists. That being so, the justification Page gives to support the prior probability he gave to god's creating consciousness does not seem to be a robust one.

What boosts the probability of naturalism's being true and there being consciousness is the possibility of there being worlds that promote the coming into being of consciousness. To get over this difficulty Page narrows down the possible worlds to those that are similar in terms of their laws of nature to our actual world. He does so without dwelling on why it is more plausible to narrow down the possible worlds to those that have the similar laws of nature as our own world. It is pretty much conceivable that there are possible worlds that have different laws of nature and that promote the coming into being of consciousness. For this reason, his appeal to the laws of nature is not well-grounded until he justifies why he limits himself to the laws of nature similar to the actual world.

Page is pretty much liberal when it comes to the nature of consciousness. Whether materialist or dualist or panpsychist account of consciousness, for Page what counts is whether it is more probable that consciousness exists on the given particular account over the rival live option. Hence, he sets out to show that on each of the accounts mentioned theism is more probable. Let us take the materialist account of consciousness. According to the materialist account, consciousness is either identified with or somehow reduced, depending on the particular account, to what is material. So, there is nothing over and above the material. Since there are none but material entities and none but material causation, immaterial properties or substances that are thought to be more coherent with theism cannot be appealed to. Even so, Page maintains that for there to be consciousness the material entities have to somehow or other come together and act in some particular way, whereby they would constitute some kind of organized complexity. Thus, the question for Page is this: on which live option, i.e., theism or naturalism, is consciousness more probable? Page attests that some kind of organized complexity is of very low probability on naturalism, especially

when that organized complexity serves some kind of purpose.<sup>51</sup> However, there are some proposed natural explanations of organized complexity.<sup>52</sup> Hence, this move does not seem to be that much satisfactory.

On the other hand, being that much liberal about the nature of consciousness is to ignore the specific details of the positions Page dwells on. For instance, physicalism is thought most of the time not to be compatible with theism. However, Page takes some feature of the physical properties that is naturally explainable, e.g., organized complexity, and argues for the conclusion that there is a god. It might be added based on this case that Page seems to be too partial when it comes to the evaluation of the different approaches to the nature of consciousness. As a result, this gives the impression that he wants to arrive at his desired conclusion, i.e., there is a god, at any price.

### **3.3.3. Appealing to God: Does It Make Sense?**

Although not every detail of the mind and brain is known, it does not seem to be unreasonable to be confident of the sciences of the mind and brain such as cognitive science and neuroscience. When the scientists pursue their research in these areas, they do not advert to some supernatural entities to explain the cause of some phenomenon. It would be absurd and unscientific to claim that some phenomenon happened because god intended it to happen, since god seems to be out of the scientific research domain. This seems pretty clear. So, what do the proponents of the argument from consciousness mean when they say that the explanation of consciousness is to be found in the intentions and actions of god?

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<sup>51</sup> As in the case of delicate quantities of the constants serving for the living beings to have appeared. This line of reasoning is to be seen in the design argument from fine-tuning.

<sup>52</sup> For such an example, see Kauffman (1995).

In line with my distinction between the first and second type of the argument from consciousness above, what the proponents of the argument mean when they say that the explanation of consciousness is to be found in the intentions and actions of god might be set out as such: First, in line with the forms of the argument of the first type, since there is no known scientific law binding the mental and physical events either god intervenes each and every time to bind them,<sup>53</sup> or god has set them at the very beginning somehow so that they are in harmony with each other throughout the other times.<sup>54</sup> Secondly, in line with the forms of the argument of the second type, what is meant might also be set out as that there is some feature of the physical entities such that that feature is somehow conducive to the arising of mind. Moreover, that feature of the physical entities is then asserted to be in need of the intentions and actions of god. This kind of strategy is what Kimble and O'Connor (2011), and Page (2020) appeal to.

Given these two kinds of understanding of the claim that the explanation of consciousness is to be found in the intentions and actions of god, there is still a question as to whether it really is necessary to appeal to god to explain consciousness. Given the first disjunct of the first understanding, it does not seem to be so attractive to appeal to god for each and every correlation of the mental and physical events. If we do so, then we invoke god to explain a whole lot of miracles occurring constantly. If we take into consideration that theists have

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<sup>53</sup> As in the case of occasionalism which introduces god as a cause for each and every interaction between the mental and physical. That is, whenever one feels pain, the cause of the pain is not the underlying physical processes, rather the cause is god. Hence, god intervenes in each and every time when someone undergoes some mental event.

<sup>54</sup> The second disjunct might be understood as having no causal effects of the mind and brain to each other as in the case of parallelism. In the case of parallelism, the mental and physical operate at the same time without having any causal interaction to each other. An advocate of parallelism might conceive of how the mental and physical operate as such:

The world is designed in such a way that events in the mental realm co-vary with events in the material realm. The model is a clockmaker who constructs a pair of perfectly synchronized chronometers the movements of which mirror one another, not because they are causally linked, but because the internal adjustments in one clock perfectly match the internal adjustments in the other (Heil, 2013, p. 33).

difficulties in reconciling only a small number of miracles with the contemporary science, it is not difficult to see that the first disjunct of the first understanding is not appealing. In addition, god would be the cause of every kind of evil in this scenario as well. If we take into consideration that the problem of evil<sup>55</sup> is a huge problem for theism, it is not difficult to see that accepting the first disjunct is not very much appealing. Given the second disjunct of the first understanding, positing god seems to be adding more entities to explain the phenomena and therefore it is not a simpler hypothesis. It seems pretty clear that it is simpler to explain the correlations between the mental and the physical without invoking god, since god would be one more entity appealed to.

With regard to the second understanding of the claim that the explanation of consciousness is to be found in the intentions and actions of god, the proponents of the argument take some feature of the physical whereby they try to arrive at a conclusion that that feature is given a better account by god. Moreover, the way they do so is first to concede some natural explanation for consciousness, then attesting that what explains the existence of consciousness is still in need of explanation. As an example, let us take the argument by Kimble and O'Connor (2011) that concedes a natural explanation for consciousness by arguing for its emergence. Moreover, the properties of the fundamental entities that are conducive to the existence of consciousness by emergence, they claim, still need a personal explanation because of their low probability to come into being on their own.

However, I do not see how appealing to god gives us a better explanation of what is already explained naturally. To start with, what is explained in this way is the cause of the effect. That is to say, the cause of the existence of consciousness is claimed to be some properties of the fundamental entities that are instantiated when they reach a certain threshold of complexity, and god is appealed to in order to explain the low probability of these fundamental entities to come into being on their own. Moreover, the effect of these fundamental entities, namely,

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<sup>55</sup> For more on the problem of evil, see Tooley (2015).

consciousness, is also claimed to be thereby explained. So, the question is this: does providing the cause of the cause ipso facto explain the effect? In other words, does god as a cause of the properties of the fundamental entities also explain consciousness which is the effect caused by the properties of the fundamental entities?

It does not seem to be the case that providing the cause of the cause is ipso facto to explain the effect. To see that providing the cause of the cause is not ipso facto to explain the effect, we might take a look at a counterexample by McDermott (1995):

My dog bites off my right forefinger. Next day I have occasion to detonate a bomb. I do it the only way I can, by pressing the button with my left forefinger; if the dog-bite had not occurred, I would have pressed the button with my right forefinger. The bomb duly explodes. It seems clear that my pressing the button with my left forefinger was caused by the dog-bite, and that it caused the explosion; yet the dog-bite was not a cause of the explosion. (p. 531)

Thus, providing a cause for the properties of the fundamental entities, i.e., god, does not ipso facto provide a cause for consciousness (the cause of which is the properties of the fundamental entities). In addition, the same points can be advanced to what Page argues in his work as well. Hence, there are good reasons to see that the second understanding of the claim that the explanation of consciousness is to be found in the intentions and actions of god is not a robust one.

All in all, the claim that the explanation of consciousness is to be found in the intentions and actions of god has difficulties that cannot be overlooked. Thus, given the claim that the explanation of consciousness is to be found in the intentions and actions of god of the proponents of the argument from consciousness has difficulties, the argument from consciousness seems to be having difficulties at the very beginning before taking off the ground.



## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have started with where the argument from consciousness lies among other arguments for the existence of god in Chapter 1. Accordingly, although some forms of the argument from consciousness have some similarities with some arguments categorized into the standard classes such as teleological, or cosmological, some other forms of the argument from consciousness are quite different from the arguments categorized into the standard classes. Hence, it is more plausible to see the argument from consciousness as an argument of its own kind.

In the second chapter, I have sketched an outline of the argument and then gave an exposition of different forms of it taking into consideration the distinction I have drawn. Accordingly, the argument from consciousness might be divided into two: the first type and the second type of the argument from consciousness. The first type includes a premise stating that there is no natural explanation for consciousness, and the second type includes a premise stating that there is some kind of natural explanation of consciousness. The first type tries to arrive at the conclusion that there is a god by justifying the premise stating that there is no natural explanation of consciousness with some features of conscious mental states, such as their being qualitative. On the other hand, the second type concedes consciousness to be naturally explainable. However, the second type looks for more, such as the probability of consciousness being high given theism, to arrive at the conclusion that there is a god. Both of these types include different forms of the argument from consciousness. While Locke (1959), Swinburne (2004), Adams (1987), and Moreland (2008) are the instances of the first type, Kimble and O'Connor (2011), and Page (2020) are the instances of the second type.

In the third chapter, I have critically examined the different forms of the argument from consciousness based on the distinction I have drawn. Accordingly, the forms of the first type of the argument from consciousness are not satisfactory since (i) they resemble the type of reasoning known as “the god of the gaps.” The arguments appealing to the inexplicability of some phenomenon and thereby trying to arrive at the conclusion that there is a god might rightly be said that they are aiming to cover some gap. Although the proponents of the first type of the argument from consciousness argue that they are not aiming to cover some gap when they appeal to the inexplicability of consciousness naturally, they do not take into consideration some leading physicalist approaches to consciousness such as representationalism. Since there are promissory physicalist approaches to consciousness, appealing to the inexplicability of consciousness to arrive at the conclusion that there is a god is the first liability of the first type of the argument from consciousness.

Also, the forms of the first type of the argument from consciousness are not satisfactory since (ii) they take dualism as starting point although it is not necessary to do so. First, it seems for some philosophers it is not incoherent to be an atheist and substance dualist at the same time. There is even a real-life example of a philosopher who is an atheist and substance dualist at the same time. Also, there are atheist philosophers, such as Oppy (2013b), who point out that there is not any conceptual difficulty in being an atheist and substance dualist at the same time. Second, there are theist philosophers that are physicalist when it comes to mentality, such as van Inwagen (1995). Lastly, it might be more reasonable for some philosophers to take phenomenal mental states to constitute what is physical given that these philosophers have some other reasons to opt for the view that phenomenal mental states are physical, such as the causal closure of the physical, even if phenomenal mental states are more persistent to physical explanation. The reason the proponents of the argument from consciousness provide their argument is to persuade the other parties. However, since the first type of the argument from consciousness is provided based on the dualist nature of consciousness, the kind of above-mentioned philosophers would not find the argument from

consciousness persuasive at the very beginning. That being so, the argument from consciousness would address only a small number of people. Given that there are only a few substance dualists today, the argument is inevitably less influential.

In addition, there is a point that makes both types of the argument from consciousness wanting. (iii) It does not seem to make sense to appeal to god to explain consciousness. The proponents of the argument do not make it clear what kind of explanation god provides for consciousness. However, what the proponents of the argument mean when they say that the explanation of consciousness is to be found in the intentions and actions of god might be set out as such: First, in line with the forms of the argument of the first type, since there is no known scientific law binding the mental and physical events either god intervenes each and every time to bind them, or god has set them at the very beginning somehow so that they are in harmony with each other throughout other times. Secondly, in line with the forms of the argument of the second type, what is meant might also be set out as that there is some feature of the physical entities such that that feature is somehow conducive to the arising of mind. However, each of the understandings of the claim that the explanation of consciousness is to be found in the intentions and actions of god has troubles. That's why, it does not seem to make sense to appeal to god to explain consciousness.

The forms of the second type of the argument are not satisfactory either. To start with, the argument Kimble and O'Connor propose is not satisfactory. On the one hand, it is too quick to appeal to emergentism based on the properties of the fundamental entities that are not settled by science yet. On the other hand, the way they present the argument, i.e., in the fashion of the design argument from fine-tuning, seems to be not a good one. To start with, every difficulty of the design argument from fine-tuning would be a difficulty of the argument from consciousness. In addition, casting the argument in such a way makes AC not a full-fledged argument but only a tiny component to support the design argument from fine-tuning. Thus, it is both too early to argue from consciousness to god in such a way, and the argument does not rest on strong footing given that it only provides some data to the design argument from fine-tuning.

The argument proposed by Page is not satisfactory either. First, the justifications he gives for the prior probabilities do not seem to be convincing. Secondly, he takes into consideration only the worlds that are similar in terms of their laws of nature without giving a compelling account why he does so. Lastly, for Page it is not of a big deal whether consciousness is of materialist or panpsychist or dualist in nature, and this gives the impression that he wants to arrive at his desired conclusion at any price, which gives the impression that he is too partial.

In conclusion, when all these points are taken into account, the argument from consciousness does not seem to be a satisfactory justification for the belief that there exists a god.

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## A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Uzun zamandır tanrının varlığına dair farklı türden argümanlar ileri sürülmektedir. Bu argümanlar, Kant (2000) izlenerek, üç kategoriye ayrılmıştır. Bunlar, tanrının varlığına dair olmak üzere kozmolojik, teleolojik ve ontolojik argümanlardır. Değinilen bu argümanların çeşitli filozoflar tarafından önerilen farklı türleri vardır. Bu argümanlar *a priori* ve *a posteriori* olmak üzere ikiye ayrılır. Kozmolojik ve teleolojik argümanlar *a posteriori* iken, ontolojik argümanlar ise *a priori*'dir. *A posteriori* olan argümanlar dış dünya hakkında deneyimize dayanan bir öncül içerirken, *a priori* olan argümanlar için ise böyle bir durum söz konusu değildir.

Bilinç Argümanı olarak adlandırılan ve tanrının varlığına dair öne sürülen bir argüman daha mevcuttur. Bu argüman şimdiye dek çok az tartışılmıştır. Hawthorne ve Isaacs (2017) bu duruma şu şekilde işaret etmektedir: “Bilinç argümanı çok çarpıcı görünüyor (ve garip bir şekilde az tartışılıyor).” Ayrıca, bu argümanı yukarıda sayılan standart kategorilere dahil etmek oldukça zordur. Bazı türleri teleolojik argümanın bazı türlerine oldukça benzerken, diğer bazı türleri ise oldukça farklıdır. Örneğin, Oppy'nin bir çalışmasında (2006) bilinç argümanı “Diğer Argümanlar” adlı bölümde görülmektedir. Bilinç argümanı bir tür teleolojik veya kozmolojik argüman olarak kabul edilemese de buna rağmen bilinç argümanı *a posteriori*'dir. Argümanın *a posteriori* olmasının nedeni, bilinç argümanının deneyime, yani bilinçli zihinsel durumların varlığının deneyimine, hitap eden bir öncülü içermesidir.

Bu bağlamda tezin birinci bölümünde tanrının varlığına ilişkin ele alınan argümanlar içerisinde bilinç argümanının nerede konumlandığının üzerinde durulmaktadır. Buna göre, bilinç argümanının bazı türleri teleolojik veya kozmolojik gibi standart sınıflara kategorize edilen argümanlarla benzerlik gösterse de diğer bazı türleri ise ciddi anlamda farklılık göstermektedir. Bu

nedenle, bilinç argümanını kendi türünden bir argüman olarak ele almak daha makuldür.

İkinci bölümde ise, bilinç argümanının bir taslağı çizilmiş ve ardından yapılan ayırım dikkate alınarak argümanın farklı türlerinin sunumuna yer verilmiştir. Buna göre, bilinç argümanı bir tanrının var olduğu sonucuna varmak için bilinci veri olarak kullanmaktadır. Bilinç argümanının öncüllerinden biri ya bilincin bizatihi varlığına ya da fiziksel olaylar ile zihinsel olaylar arasındaki ilişkilere dayanmaktadır. Hal böyle olunca, argümanın savunucuları bilincin tanrının var olduğu inancını ispat etme özelliğinin olduğunu ileri sürmektedirler. Bu bağlamda, bilinçli olduğumuzda, bir tür niteliksel yönü olan zihinsel bir duruma sahip olmaktadır. Bir diğer ifade ile, öznenin belirli bir bilinç durumuna sahip olmanın nasıl bir şey olduğunun (*what it is like*<sup>56</sup>) farkında olmasını sağlayan ham bir duyu vardır. Ayrıca, kişinin bu zihinsel durumun niteliksel yönüne farklı bir erişim şekli vardır. Örneğin, vücudumun herhangi bir yerinde acı hissettiğimde o acıyı tecrübe etmenin nasıl bir şey olduğunun farkında olurum. Öte yandan, etrafımdaki herhangi bir kişi ancak benim belirli davranışlarımı, kaşlarımı çatmam gibi, görebilir. Dahası, bu tecrübe ettiğim zihin durumunun farkındalığına aynı zamanda dolaysız bir şekilde varabilirim. Tecrübe ettiğim acının farkına varabilmem için herhangi bir akıl yürütme yöntemine başvurmam gerekmemektedir. Ancak beni izleyen kişi sergilediğim davranışlardan acı çektiğim yönünde çıkarımda bulunmalıdır.

Bilinç argümanının savunucuları, bu tür zihinsel durumların tanrının varlığına işaret ettiği görüşündedir. Bazı filozoflar bu tür zihinsel durumlar için doğalcı bir açıklama olmadığını ve bu nedenle bu türden fenomenleri daha iyi açıklayan kişisel bir açıklama (teistik bir açıklama) olduğunu belirtirler ve argümanlarını bu özelliği dikkate alarak sunarlar. Öte yandan, kimi bazı filozoflar ise bilincin bir tür doğalcı açıklaması olduğunu belirtirler de tasarım argümanları veya Bayesci tarzındaki akıl yürütmelere benzer tarzda argüman türlerine başvurarak bilincin var

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<sup>56</sup> İfadenin kökeni için bkz. Nagel (1974).

olduğundan yola çıkarak tanrının var olduğu sonucuna varmanın bir yolu olduğu görüşündedirler.

Bilinç argümanının John Locke'a (1959) kadar uzanan uzun bir geçmişi vardır. Ayrıca, bilinç argümanının Swinburne (2004), Adams (1987), Moreland (2008), Kimble ve O'Connor (2011) ve Page (2020) gibi çağdaş filozoflar tarafından önerilen farklı türleri vardır. Argümanın bu farklı türleri iki tipe ayrılabilir. İlki, bilinç için doğalcı bir açıklama olmadığını öne süren öncülü temel alır. İkinci tip ise, bilincin doğalcı bir açıklaması olduğunu kabul etse de tanrının var olduğu sonucuna varmak için farklı bir yol izlemektedir. Buna göre, Locke (1959), Swinburne (2004), Adams (1987) ve Moreland (2008) birinci tipin örnekleri iken, Kimble ve O'Connor (2011) ve Page (2020) ikinci tipin örnekleridir.

Bilinç argümanının ilk tipine kategorize edilen örnekler bilinç için doğalcı bir açıklamanın olmadığını ifade eden bir öncül içermektedir. Bu öncül, belirli bir filozofa bağlı olarak çeşitli şekillerde gerekçelendirilmektedir. Mackie'nin (1987, s. 187) Swinburne'ü (2004) Locke'un "uzak bir nesli" olarak adlandırmasının nedeni, bilincin doğalcı bir açıklaması olmadığını belirten öncülü Locke'tan yalnızca biraz daha farklı bir şekilde savunmasından dolayıdır. Bilinç argümanının birinci tipindeki diğer örnekleri için de durum pek farklı değildir. Bu nedenle, birinci tip bilinç argümanının örneklerinin her biri aynı zamanda Locke'un "uzak bir nesli" olarak da adlandırılabilir.

Birinci tipe örnek olarak Moreland'ın sunduğu argüman verilebilir. Moreland (2008) argümanını şu şekilde sunmaktadır:

1. Zihinsel olaylar, var olan gerçek, fiziksel olmayan zihinsel varlıklardır.
2. Belirli zihinsel olay türleri, belirli fiziksel olay türleri ile düzenli olarak ilişkilidir.
3. Bu ilişkiler için bir açıklama vardır.
4. Kişisel açıklama, doğalcı bilimsel açıklamadan farklıdır.
5. Bu ilişkilerin açıklaması ya kişisel ya da doğalcı bilimsel bir açıklamadır.
6. Açıklama, bir doğalcı bilimsel açıklama değildir.
7. Bu nedenle, açıklama kişiseldir.
8. Açıklama kişisel ise, o zaman teistiktir.
9. Bu nedenle, açıklama teistiktir. (s. 37)

Moreland, birinci öncülün doğru olduğunu varsaymakla başlar. Yani zihinsel durumların fiziksel olmadığını varsayar. Ayrıca teizmi ve materyalizmi tek canlı seçenek olarak kabul eder. Swinburne ve Adams gibi, Moreland da dördüncü öncülde kişisel ve bilimsel açıklama olmak üzere iki tür açıklama arasında bir ayrım yapar. İkinci öncüle gelindiğinde, çok fazla tartışma yok gibi görünmektedir. Bu öncül, Moreland'ın ilk öncüle, yani fiziksel olmayan zihinsel durumların olduğu varsayımına, dayanarak da kabul edilebilir. Fiziksel ve fiziksel olmayan durumlar bu resimde ilişkilidir, çünkü biri diğerine indirgenemez veya biri diğerinin aynısı olduğu sayılamaz. Bunlar göz önüne alındığında, Moreland üçüncü öncülde bir açıklama aramaktadır.

Altıncı öncül için, yani zihinsel durumların açıklamasının bilimsel olmadığını doğrulamak için, Moreland aşağıdaki faktörleri öne sürer. İlk faktör, doğanın tekdüzeliğidir. Yani, doğada en başından beri yalnızca bilinçten yoksun varlıklar vardır. Ancak, şu anda bilinçle karşılaştığımızı göre, bu hiçten bir şey elde etmek gibidir, diyor Moreland. İkincisi, zihin-beden ilişkisinin olumsuzluğudur. Bu, zihin-beden korelasyonu söz konusu olduğunda, gerekli bazı zorunlu bağlantıların bulunmadığını söylemektedir. Üçüncüsü, fizikselin nedensel kapalılık ilkesidir (*causal closure of the physical*). Bu ilkeye göre, kişi hangi fiziksel sonucu seçerse seçsin, bu fiziksel sonucun bir fiziksel nedeni olmalıdır. Ayrıca, nedenler sırası aynı düzeyde, yani fiziksel olarak kalır. Sonucusu ise evrimsel açıklamaların yetersizliği ile ilgilidir. Canlılar evrim teorisi açısından kara kutulardır. İçlerinde bazı bilinçli süreçler olmadan pekâlâ hayatta kalabilirler. Sonuç olarak, bu düşünceler, zihinsel varlıkların bilimsel olarak açıklanamazlığını ortaya koymaktadır.

Beşinci öncül, bilinci biyolojik natüralizm, zorunlu zuhurculuk (*emergent necessitation*), gizemcilik (*mysterianism*), panpsişizm ve zuhurcu monizm (*emergent monism*) gibi zihni doğalcı bir şekilde açıklamak için ortaya konan bazı doğalcı yaklaşımların makul olup olmadığı değerlendirilerek ele alınır. Moreland bu pozisyonların her birini yetersiz bulmaktadır. Böylelikle de zihinsel varlıkların açıklamasının kişisel olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır. Açıklama kişisel olduğunda,

Moreland'a göre teistiktir. Dolayısıyla, zihinsel varlıkların açıklamasının teistik olduğu sonucuna ulaşmaktadır Moreland.

Argümanın ilk tipinin tüm farklı türlerinin ortak noktası, bilincin varlığı için doğalcı bir açıklamanın olmadığını belirten öncüle dayanmalarındır. Bu öncülü gerekçelendirmek için, argümanın birinci tipinin farklı türleri zihinsel durumların veya fiziksel durumların çeşitli özelliklerini ele almaktadırlar. Örneğin, Swinburne bilinçli zihin durumlarının ölçülemezliğine başvurur veya Moreland, diğer özelliklerin yanı sıra, fizikselin nedensel kapalılığı ilkesine (*causal closure of the physical*) başvurur. Bilincin doğalcı bir şekilde açıklanamazlığını gerekçelendiren detayları bir yana bırakırsak, birinci tipteki örneklere içkin olan akıl yürütmeyi yansıtan bir çerçeve argüman şu şekilde verilebilir:

1. Beyin durumları ile bilinçli durumlar arasında bağlantılar vardır.
2. Bu bağlantıların açıklaması ya temel bilimsel yasalarda ya da amaçlı bir failin niyetlerinde ve eylemlerinde bulunabilir.
3. Temel bilimsel yasalar yeterli bir açıklama sağlamamaktadır.
4. Bu nedenle açıklama, amaçlı bir failin niyetlerine ve eylemlerine başvurmalıdır.

Bu tür bir akıl yürütme, bilinç argümanın ilk tipinin tüm farklı türlerinin doğasında vardır. Aralarındaki tek fark, üçüncü öncülü, yani bilincin varlığı için yeterli bilimsel bir açıklamanın olmadığını belirten öncülü gerekçelendirmeleridir. Bu öncülü haklı çıkarmak için farklı filozoflar farklı gerekçeler sunarlar. Bu sebeple, bu gerekçelerin ne kadar iyi oldukları tartışmasına girmeden önce, bilinç argümanının birinci tipinin tüm farklı türlerinin ortak noktalarına değinmek daha yerinde olacaktır. Çünkü, yukarıdaki akıl yürütme türünün yetersiz olduğu sonucu ortaya çıkarsa o zaman ana noktaları farklı şekillerde gerekçelendirmeye çalışan ayrıntılara karşı tartışmanın bir anlamı olmayacaktır. Bu nedenle, bu tezde yukarıdaki argümanda ifade edilen ana noktalardaki zorluklara işaret edilmektedir.

Öte yandan, ikinci tip olarak kategorize edilen bilinç argümanı örnekleri, bilincin belirli bir doğalcı açıklamasının olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Bununla birlikte, ikinci türün savunucuları, bir tanrı olduğu sonucuna varmak için başka bir yol ararlar. Bu ikinci tipe dahil olan iki örnek vardır. Bunlardan ilki Kimble ve O'Connor'ın (2011), ikincisi ise Page'in (2020) çalışmasıdır.

Bilinç argümanının ikinci tipinin bir örneği olarak Kimble ve O'Connor (2011) tarafından sunulan argüman örnek olarak verilebilir. Kimble ve O'Connor (2011) argümanlarını sunmadan önce zihnin düalist bir doğası olduğunu ortaya koymayı amaçlıyorlar. Zihnin düalist doğasını ortaya koymak için zihin felsefesi literatüründe önde gelen iki fizikalist bilinç teorisini ele alıyorlar. Bilince yönelik bu iki fizikalist yaklaşımı yetersiz bulduktan sonra, bu filozoflar daha iyi bir alternatif olarak ilkelcilik (*primitivism*) olarak adlandırdıkları düalist bir açıklama önermektedirler. Çok genel bir ifadeyle, ilkelcilik iç gözlem yapıldığında zihinsel durumların basit bir doğası olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Buna göre, bu zihinsel durumlar daha başka parçalardan oluşmazlar. Bununla birlikte, zihinsel durumlar evrenin daha temel fiziksel parçalarının belirli özelliklere sahip olmalarından dolayı zuhur etmişlerdir (*emerge*). Bu doğrultuda, temel varlıklar, tıpkı “...dengeleyici kuvvetlerin yokluğunda negatif yüklü parçacıkların birbirini itme eğilimi gibi” (Kimble & O'Connor, 2011, s. 136) yerel özelliklerinin yanı sıra, belirli bir karmaşıklık eşiğine ulaştıklarında kendilerini gösteren ilişkisel özelliklere sahiptir. Böylelikle ortaya çıkan özellikler ise fiziksel olana indirgenemeyeceği gibi fiziksel olanla da aynı sayılamaz.

Kimble ve O'Connor'a göre her ne kadar böylelikle düalist özellikler olsa bile, bunların doğalcı bir açıklamasını sağlamak oldukça olasıdır. Evrendeki varlıkların davranışlarını açıklayan çok basit bir denklem yerine, bu varlıkların ilişkilerini ve bu varlıkların bir araya geldiğinde ortaya çıkan özellikleri gösteren çok az denklem olabilir. Böylece, bu çok az denklem, evrendeki en temel varlıkların davranışını ve bu davranışları sonucu ortaya çıkan zihinsel özellikleri gösteren en temel denklemler olacaktır. Sonuç olarak, bilinç doğası gereği düalist olsa bile, yine de onun hakkında doğalcı bir açıklama mümkün olacaktır.



Kimble ve O'Connor'un argümanı burada bitmemektedir. Onlar, bilinçten yola çıkarak tanrının varlığını ortaya koymanın hâlâ bir yolu olduğu görüşündedirler. Kimble ve O'Connor bilinç argümanının bir tür tasarım argümanına dönüştürülebileceğini iddia etmektedirler. Tasarım argümanından kasıtları özellikle daha yaygın olan "hassas ayar argümanı" olarak adlandırılan türüdür. Buna göre, zihinsel özelliklerin var olmasını mümkün kılan temel varlıkların çok geniş bir varlık yelpazesinde olmasına rağmen bu varlıklar bu yelpazenin yalnızca küçük bir kısmını oluşturmaktadır. Bu durumda zihinsel özelliklerin evrende ortaya çıkma olasılığının çok düşük olması evrenin hassas ayarlı olduğuna dair bir başka veridir. Kimble ve O'Connor, argümanlarını ortaya koymak için Neil A. Manson'ın (2003) adımlarını takip etmektedir. Onlar, ayrıntılara girmek yerine, yalnızca argümanın Bayesci doğrulama teorisinin biçimsel aygıtında nasıl kurulabileceğinin ana hatlarını çizmektedirler.<sup>57</sup>

Üçüncü bölümde, yapılan ayrıma dayalı olarak bilinç argümanının farklı biçimleri eleştirel olarak incelenmiştir. Buna göre, bilinç argümanının birinci tipinin farklı türleri tatmin edici değildir. Çünkü (i) "boşlukların tanrısı" olarak bilinen akıl yürütme tarzına benzemektedirler. Bazı fenomenlerin açıklanamazlığına başvuran ve böylece bir tanrı olduğu sonucuna varmaya çalışan argümanların, haklı olarak bir boşluğu kapatmayı amaçladıkları söylenebilir. Bilinç argümanının ilk tipinin savunucuları, bilincin doğalcı olarak açıklanamazlığına başvurduklarında bir boşluğu kapatmayı amaçlamadıklarını iddia etseler de temsilcilik

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<sup>57</sup> "L = Evrenin temel parametreleri zeki yaşam formunun var olması için hassas bir şekilde ayarlanmış olsa gerek.

E = Bizim evrenimiz zeki yaşam formunu mümkün kılmaktadır.

D = Doğayı aşan bir evren tasarımcısı vardır.

"P(A/B)" "B doğru olduğunda A'nın olasılığı" şeklinde okunduğunda, argümanın savunucuları şunları ileri sürmektedirler:

P(E/L & ~D) oldukça düşüktür.

P(E/L & D) önemlidir.

P(D/L) P(E/L & ~D)'den önemli bir şekilde daha büyüktür." (Kimble & O'Connor, 2011, s. 139)

(*representationalism*) gibi bilince yönelik önde gelen bazı fizikalist yaklaşımları dikkate almamaktadırlar. Bilincin umut vadeden fizikalist yaklaşımları olduğu için, bir tanrı olduğu sonucuna varmak için bilincin açıklanamazlığına başvurmak bilinç argümanının ilk tipinin ilk sorunudur.

Yine, bilinç argümanının birinci tipinin farklı türleri tatmin edici değildir, çünkü (ii) gerekli olmamasına rağmen düalizmi başlangıç noktası olarak kabul etmektedirler. İlk olarak, öyle görülüyor ki bazı felsefeciler için hem töz düalisti hem de ateist olmak birbirini dışlayan şeyler değil. Aynı anda hem ateist hem de töz düalisti olan bir filozofun gerçek hayattan bir örneği vardır. Ayrıca, tanınmış ateist din felsefecilerinden olan Oppy (2013b) aynı anda hem ateist hem de töz düalisti olmanın kavramsal bir zorluğu olmadığına dikkat çekmiştir. Böyle bir durumun nasıl mümkün olabileceğini şu şekilde örneklendirir (2013b, s. 55): “...natüralist\*, ruhların, beyinlerin uygun işlevsel seviyeye ulaşmasıyla meydana geldiğini iddia edebilir. Doğru işleyiş düzeyinde, ruhlar, doğru işlev düzeyine sahip beyinlerle nedensel olarak etkileşime girmeye devam eder ve beyinlerin bu düzeyde işlev göstermeyi bırakmasıyla ruhların varoluştan çıkmalarına neden olur.” İkincisi, van Inwagen (1995) gibi bilinç söz konusu olduğunda hem fizikalist hem de teist olan filozoflar vardır. Son olarak, bazı filozoflar diğer başka bazı nedenlerden dolayı fizikalizmi tercih edebilirler. Her ne kadar bu filozoflar için fenomenal zihin durumları fizikalist bir açıklama için daha zorlayıcı olsa da ve bu zihin durumları için yeterince tatmin edici bir fizikalist açıklamaları olmasa da fizikalizm için diğer nedenlerinden dolayı fenomenal zihin durumlarının fizikalist çerçevede yer aldıklarını kabul etmelerini daha makul görebilirler.

Sonuç olarak, bilinç argümanının savunucularının argümanlarını sunmalarının nedeni diğer tarafları ikna etmektir. Bununla birlikte, bilinç argümanının ilk tipi bilincin düalist doğasına dayanarak sunulduğu için, yukarıda bahsedilen türdeki filozoflar, bilinç argümanını en başta ikna edici bulmayacaklardır. Bu durumda, bilinç argümanı sadece az sayıda insana hitap edecektir. Bugün çok az sayıda töz düalisti olduğu göz önüne alındığında (Kim, 2011), argüman kaçınılmaz olarak daha az etkili olacaktır. Bu nedenle, bilinçten yola çıkılarak tanrının varlığı

yönünde bir argüman ortaya koymanın belirli bir tür düalizmi gerekli kıldığı iddiası argümanı sağlam temellerinden yoksun bırakmaktadır.

Ayrıca, her iki tür argümanı da kusurlu kılan bir nokta vardır. (iii) Bilinci açıklamak için Tanrı'ya başvurmak mantıklı görünmemektedir. Argümanın savunucuları, tanrının bilinç için ne tür bir açıklama sağladığını netleştirdikleri durumda sorunlar ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, bilincin açıklamasının Tanrı'nın niyetlerinde ve eylemlerinde bulunduğunu söylerken argümanın savunucularının ne demek istedikleri şu şekilde ortaya konabilir: İlki, argümanın birinci tipinin türleri ile uyumlu olarak, zihinsel ve fiziksel olayları ilişkilendiren bilinen bir bilimsel yasa olmadığı için ya tanrı her seferinde onları ilişkilendirmek için müdahale eder, ya da tanrı onları bir şekilde en baştan belirlemiştir ve böylece diğer zamanlarda birbirleriyle uyum içinde olmaları mümkün kılınmıştır. İkinci olarak, argümanın ikinci tipinin türleriyle uyumlu olarak, kastedilen şu şekilde anlaşılabilir: fiziksel varlıkların belirli bir özelliğinin olduğu ve bu özelliğin bir şekilde zihnin ortaya çıkmasına yardımcı olduğu; dahası, bu özelliğin hala bir açıklamaya ihtiyaç duyduğu. Ancak bilincin açıklanmasının tanrının niyet ve fiillerinde bulunacağı iddiasındaki anlayışların her biri kendi içinde sorunlar barındırmaktadır.

İlk anlayışın ilk ayrımı göz önüne alındığında, zihinsel ve fiziksel olayların her bir korelasyonu için tanrıya başvurmak çok fazla cazip görünmemektedir. Bunu yaparsak, sürekli olarak meydana gelen birçok mucizeyi açıklamak için tanrıya başvurmak zorunda kalırız. Teistlerin çok az sayıdaki mucizeleri çağdaş bilimle bağdaştırmakta zorlandıklarını göz önünde bulundurursak, ilk anlayışın ilk ayrımının pek de cazip olmadığını görmek zor değildir. Ayrıca bu senaryoda da her türlü kötülüğün sebebi tanrı olacaktır. Kötülük probleminin teizm için çok büyük bir mesele olduğunu göz önünde bulundurursak, birinci anlayışın ilk ayrımını kabul etmenin pek de cezbedici olmadığını görmek zor değildir. Birinci anlayışın ikinci ayrılığı göz önüne alındığında, tanrıyı varsaymakla fenomenleri açıklamak için daha fazla varlık ekleniyor gibi görünmekte ve bu nedenle de daha basit bir hipotez ortaya çıkmamaktadır. Zihinsel ve fiziksel süreçler arasındaki

ilişkiyi, tanrıya başvurmadan açıklamanın daha basit olduğu oldukça açık görünmektedir. Bu durumda tanrı başvuru bir başka varlık olmaktadır.

Bilincin açıklamasının Tanrı'nın niyet ve eylemlerinde bulunabileceği iddiasının ikinci anlayışıyla ilgili olarak, argümanın savunucuları fiziksel olanın bazı özelliklerini göz önünde bulundurarak bu özelliklerin kökeninin tanrıda bulunduğu türü bir açıklamaya gerek olduğu sonucuna varmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Böylelikle tanrının daha iyi bir açıklama sunduğunu ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadırlar. Dahası, bunu yapma biçimleri, önce bilinç için doğalcı bir açıklama kabul etmek, ardından bilincin varlığını açıklayan şeyin hâlâ izah edilmeye ihtiyaç duyduğunu ifade etmektir. Örnek olarak Kimble ve O'Connor'ın (2011) bilincin ortaya çıkışını ele alarak doğalcı bir açıklamayı kabul eden argümanını alalım. Ki onlar bilincin ortaya çıkmasına yardımcı olan temel varlıkların özelliklerinin kendi başlarına oluşma olasılıklarının çok düşük olması nedeniyle hala kişisel bir açıklamaya ihtiyaç duyduklarını iddia etmektedirler.

Ancak, Tanrı'ya başvurmak, bize zaten doğalcı olarak açıklanmış olanı daha iyi açıklamaz gibi görünüyor. İlk olarak, bu şekilde açıklanan şey, sonucun nedenidir. Yani, temel varlıkların belirli bir karmaşıklık eşliğine geldiklerinde bazı özelliklerinin bilincin ortaya çıkmasını mümkün kıldığı iddia ediliyor ve bu temel varlıkların kendi başlarına ortaya çıkmalarının düşük olasılığını açıklamak için tanrıya başvuruluyor. Ayrıca bilincin nedeni olan bu temel varlıkların da böylelikle açıklandığı iddia edilmektedir. Öyleyse sorulması gereken soru şudur: Sonucun nedenini açıkladığımız durumda sonucu da açıklamış oluyor muyuz? Başka bir deyişle, tanrı temel varlıkların özelliklerinin bir nedeni olarak temel varlıkların özelliklerinin bir nedeni olan bilinci de açıklar mı?

Görünen o ki, nedenin nedenini sunmak sonucun nedenini sunmak anlamına gelmiyor. Nedenin nedenini sunmanın sonucun nedenini sunmak olmadığını görmek için McDermott (1995) tarafından verilen bir karşı örneğe bakabiliriz:

Köpeğim sağ işaret parmağımı ısırtıyor. Ertesi gün bir bomba patlatmak için fırsatım oluyor. Yapabildiğim tek şekilde olarak sol işaret parmağımla düğmeye basarak yapıyorum yapmak istediğimi; köpek ısırtığı olmasaydı sağ işaret

parmağımla düğmeye basardım. Bomba gerektiği gibi patlıyor. Sol işaret parmağımla düğmeye basmamın köpek ısırmasından kaynaklandığı ve patlamaya bunun neden olduğu açık; yine de köpek ısırığı patlamanın nedeni değildir. (s. 531)

Dolayısıyla, temel varlıkların özellikleri için bir neden sunmak, bu durumdaki neden tanrı olmaktadır, böylelikle bilinç için bir neden sağlamaz (ki bilincin nedeni temel varlıkların özellikleri olmaktadır).

Argümanın ikinci tipinin türleri de ikna edici değildir. İlk olarak, Kimble ve O'Connor'ın önerdiği argüman ikna edici değildir. Bir yandan, temel varlıkların özelliklerine dayalı olarak bilincin zuhur ettiğini öne sürmek için çok erkendir. Öyle ki, henüz temel varlıklara atfedilen özellikler bilim tarafından ortaya konmamıştır. Öte yandan, argümanı sunma biçimleri, yani tasarım argümanının bir türü olan hassas ayar argümanı tarzında sunmaları, iyi değil gibi görünmektedir. İlk olarak, tasarım argümanının bir türü olan hassas ayar argümanının her bir zorluğu bilinç argümanının bir zorluğu olacaktır. Ek olarak, argümanı bu şekilde ortaya koymak bilinç argümanını tam teşekküllü bir argüman değil, tasarım argümanının bir türü olan hassas ayar argümanını destekleyen küçük bir bileşen yapacaktır. Bu nedenle, hem bilinçten yola çıkarak tanrının var olduğu ifadesine varmak için bu şekilde bir yol izlemek çok erken hem de hassas ayar argümanına yalnızca bazı veriler sağladığı için bilinç argümanının kendisi sağlam temellere sahip olmamaktadır.

Page (2020) tarafından sunulan argüman da tatmin edici değildir. İlk olarak, önsel olasılıklar için verdiği gerekçeler inandırıcı görünmemektedir. İkinci olarak, doğa yasaları açısından bizim dünyamıza benzer olan dünyaları dikkate almaktadır ve neden böyle yaptığı hakkında etkili herhangi bir gerekçe sunmamaktadır. Son olarak, Page için bilincin doğası gereği materyalist mi yoksa panpsişist mi yoksa düalist mi olduğu önemli değildir ve bu, istediği sonuca ne pahasına olursa olsun varmak istediği izlenimini vermektedir ki bu da onun oldukça taraflı olduğu izlenimini vermektedir.

Sonuç olarak, tüm bu noktalar dikkate alındığında, bilinç argümanı tanrının var olduğu inancı için tatmin edici bir gerekçe gibi görünmemektedir

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